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CHAPTER 1
Is There Really Excess Comovement? Causal Evidence
from FTSE 100 Index Turnover
1.1. Abstract
Stock returns seem to comove in excess of common news about stock fundamen-
tals. This article examines if comovement really changes when stocks are added to
or deleted from the FTSE 100 stock index, an event containing no news about stock
fundamantals. I exploit the FTSE index balancing rule, which represents a natural
experiment of exogenous index turnover. I nd that random index turnover has
no signicant e¤ect on comovement. I also show that index turnover can be non-
random and introduce a selection bias that overstates the e¤ect on comovement. It
therefore appears that index turnover does not cause a change in comovement, but
much rather the reverse e¤ect exists: a change in comovement, possibly correlated
with unobserved stock characteristics, seems to cause index turnover. My ndings
are consistent with the fundamentals-based hypothesis; rejections in the previous
literature may be due to non-random index turnover.
1
21.2. Introduction
If investors are rational and there are no limits to arbitrage, then stocks should
be valued fundamentally by discounted cash ows. Accordingly, the comovement
of stock prices with each other should reect common variation of news about stock
fundamentals, such as future cash ows and discount rates. However, empirical
research nds comovement in excess of the common variation of fundamental fac-
tors. In particular, events that contain no news about fundamentals seem to a¤ect
stock comovement. For example, a stocks comovement with an index increases
when the stock is added to the index and decreases when it is deleted. Excess
comovement is attributed to correlated trading patterns of investor groups: many
institutions are forced to hold index stocks1 and create a correlated demand shock
when a stock is added to the index. Based on these ndings, the empirical liter-
ature rejects the fundamentals-based hypothesis. However, an important concern
with these studies is that they rely on variation in index membership that is un-
likely to be random. The correlation between unobserved stock characteristics and
index turnover cannot be ruled out. It is therefore di¢ cult to establish whether or
not index turnover really causes excess comovement.
I examine if stock index turnover causes a change in the comovement of stock
and index returns through investors who allocate capital to categories dened by
index membership. FTSE chooses index constituents with simple and transparent
1According to the Investment Management Association, in 2012 index tracker funds accounted
for £ 71.7bn of savings in Britain, or 9.6 percent of the total money invested. Five years ago, this
gure was £ 30bn.
3rules, based on market capitalization rank. The FTSE 100 balancing rule generates
index turnover that is random, after controlling for market capitalization rank. A
change in comovement around these events identies the causal e¤ect of FTSE 100
index membership changes. Using this random sample, I nd no signicant e¤ect
on comovement. I also show that index turnover can be non-random and introduce
a selection bias that exaggerates the e¤ect on comovement. It therefore appears
that index turnover does not cause a change in comovement, but much rather the
reverse e¤ect exists: a change in comovement, possibly correlated with unobserved
stock characteristics, seems to cause index turnover.
When a stock is added to the FTSE 100, buying by institutions that are forced
to hold the index for benchmarking and tracking purposes creates a correlated
demand shock. Provided the covariance structure of fundamental factors is sta-
tionary, the fundamentals-based hypothesis predicts that such demand shocks do
not a¤ect the comovement of stock returns. However, nding a change in stock
comovement upon index turnover alone is not su¢ cient to reject the fundamentals-
based hypothesis. A change in the covariance structure of fundamental factors may
cause index turnover and a contemporaneous change in stock comovement. This
paper uses a random sample of FTSE 100 index turnover stocks that have a sta-
tionary covariance structure of fundamental factors and provides a causal test of
the fundamentals-based hypothesis.
The FTSE index membership rules are straightforward. Every quarter all eli-
gible U.K.-listed stocks are ranked by market capitalization. FTSE uses a banding
4policy in order to avoid frequent index turnover. Stocks must climb to rank 90 or
better to be included in the FTSE 100 index, and drop to rank 111 or worse to be
excluded. Generally, stocks within the rank band from 91 to 110 are not turned
over.
The identication strategy uses three aspects of these rules: rst, unobserved
variables have no direct inuence on index turnover. The sole stock characteristic
that causes index turnover is market capitalization rank; therefore, only stock
characteristics correlated with market capitalization rank a¤ect index turnover.
Second, the FTSE 100 must always have 100 constituents. Whenever the number
of additions from banding di¤ers from the number of deletions, FTSE must shift
marginal stocks either into or out of the index in order to balance the total to 100
constituents. These marginal stocks are always located inside the band. Balancing
of these stocks only depends on the rank of other stocks outside the band and is
therefore plausibly random. Marginal stocks that would otherwise have remained
just outside (inside) the index are therefore randomly added to (deleted from) it.
Third, the banding policy generates a control group for empirical tests. After every
quarterly review, there are 10 index and 10 non-index stocks within the market
capitalization rank band on arbitrary and overlapping ranks. The characteristics
of marginal stocks are random, conditional on market capitalization rank and prior
index membership. Marginal stocks that experience no balancing index turnover
are therefore a suitable control group for those that do.
5Using the full sample of FTSE 100 index turnover stocks, I regress daily stock
on index returns and show that comovement changes signicantly around index
turnover, a nding consistent with Barberis et al. (2005) analysis of the S&P 500.
However, if only balancing index turnover is used in a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
(DID) analysis with controls for market capitalization rank, then the e¤ect of in-
dex turnover on comovement disappears. Similarly, a DID analysis that matches
balancing index turnover with non-turnover stocks by rank also shows no signi-
cant e¤ect on comovement. Non-random index turnover therefore appears to create
a substantial selection bias that exaggerates the index turnover e¤ect on comove-
ment. However, random FTSE 100 balancing index turnover causes no signicant
change in comovement. I check these ndings using turnover generated from a
simulated placebo index. Non-random banding turnover from the placebo index
creates a similar selection bias that disappears for random balancing. My results
are therefore consistent with the fundamentals-based hypothesis and suggest that
rejections in the previous literature may be due to non-random index turnover.
The previous literature maintains that excess comovement in stock returns is
connected to trading patterns of investor groups. Delong et al. (1993), Pindyck
and Rotemberg (1993), Vijh (1994) nd that excess comovement can be explained
by common liquidity shocks from the price impact of correlated investor demand.
Antón and Polk (2013) nd that common analyst coverage and stock ownership
increases covariation. Index turnover is frequently used to analyze changes in
comovement. Vijh (1994) and Barberis et al. (2005) nd that S&P 500 index
6turnover changes comovement and relate it to investors trading index stocks to-
gether. FTSE membership rules are mechanical and fully transparent, but S&P
constituents are determined by committee in condential discussions. These pa-
pers therefore cannot rule out that S&P 500 index turnover is correlated with
unobserved stock characteristics. Denis et al. (2003) suggest that S&P 500 in-
dex turnover causes stock characteristics to change. Antón (2010) nds that S&P
selects stocks with increasing betas. Chen et al. (2014) nd that S&P additions
display high momentum. A closely related paper by Boyer (2011) claims that
S&P/Barra stock labeling into investing style categories induces excess comove-
ment. The S&P/Barra balancing index turnover is similar in that it depends on
the di¤erence in total market capitalization between two style categories. However,
the single cut-o¤ provides neither random index turnover nor a contemporaneous
control group. In contrast, FTSE 100 banding creates both random balancing in-
dex turnover and a contemporaneous control group. Chang et al. (2013) focus on
the Russell 1000 index and nd excess comovement in index turnover. However,
they use data from before Russell introduced a banding policy and therefore index
turnover is unlikely to be random.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.3 explains the FTSE
100 index and balancing index turnover, Section 1.4 introduces the empirical tests,
Section 1.5 describes the data, Section 1.6 presents the main results, Section 1.7
analyzes the robustness of the results, and Section 1.8 closes with a summary.
71.3. FTSE 100 Balancing Turnover
The main empirical challenge of measuring the e¤ect of index turnover on co-
movement is to establish causality: does index turnover cause a change in stock
comovement, or does a change in comovement cause an addition to or deletion
from the index? Most previous studies simply assume that index turnover, which
is usually caused by a change in market capitalization rank, is not correlated with
stock characteristics. However, this assumption is questionable. I use the FTSE
100 banding policy to neutralize the non-random e¤ect of market capitalization
rank on index turnover. There may be some additional residual endogenous varia-
tion, but eliminating the correlation between market capitalization rank and index
turnover alone explains almost all the "excess" comovement in the literature. This
approach is a departure from most empirical work on comovement, which has failed
to establish a causal e¤ect. The rest of the section describes a natural experiment
embedded in he FTSE 100 banding policy, which I use as a source of random varia-
tion in index turnover. The main goal is to motivate my identication assumption
that FTSE 100 index balancing has a random e¤ect on stock characteristics in-
cluding comovement, when controlled for market capitalization rank.
1.3.1. The FTSE 100 Index
The Financial Times-Stock Exchange 100 Index (FTSE 100), informally called
"Footsie", is the most widely used stock market index of the 100 largest rms
8listed in the U.K. The FTSE 250 index contains stocks too small for the FTSE
100. The FTSE 100 is more popular than the FTSE 250 as a benchmark for
investors, and stocks promoted to the FTSE 100 receive a positive demand shock.
Stocks moving between the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 250 are the main focus of
this study.
FTSE membership is rule-based, fully transparent, and based on market cap-
italization rank. The FTSE 100 index constituents are reviewed quarterly2 to en-
sure that the index remains representative of the largest rms listed in the market.
FTSE uses a banding policy in order to avoid frequent membership changes.
There are four types of FTSE 100 index turnover:
(1) Ordinary banding turnover (Type-1). At each quarterly review, index
membership changes when stocks leave the market capitalization rank
band: stocks ranked 90 or better are included, and stocks ranked 111 or
worse are excluded.
(2) Ordinary balancing turnover (Type-2) . If the number of Type-1 additions
and deletions does not match, then FTSE shifts marginal stocks into or
out of the index in order to balance the total to 100 constituents. If there
are more Type-1 banding additions than deletions, then the lowest ranked
2Since 1993, on the Wednesday after the rst Friday in March, June, September and December.
The market capitalization rank is determined based on the closing prices of the quarterly review
date. Constituent and weight changes are announced before the market opens the next day and
usually become e¤ective 12 calendar days after the review.
9FTSE 100 stocks are deleted. If there are more Type-1 banding deletions
than additions, then the highest ranked FTSE 250 stocks are added.
(3) Extraordinary turnover (Type-3). Membership changes between quarterly
reviews if large new issues are added under fast entry rules, and stocks
bound to be de-listed, including rms subject to unconditional takeover
bids, are deleted from the index.
(4) Extraordinary balancing turnover (Type-4). For every extraordinary addi-
tion, FTSE deletes the lowest-ranked FTSE 100 member on the previous
trading day. For every extraordinary deletion, FTSE adds the highest-
ranked stock on the reserve list. The reserve list includes the six highest-
ranked FTSE 250 members on the previous quarterly review date.
Figure 1.1 shows an example of ordinary FTSE 100 index turnover: Stock A
climbs to rank 90 and is added to the index. Stocks C and D fall to rank 111
and 112, respectively, and are both deleted. Stock B has to be added in order to
balance the index. Stocks A, C, and D are Type-1 banding index turnover because
they move outside the market capitalization band. Stock B is the highest-ranked
marginal stock inside the rank band and solely added to the index because the
number of Type-1 deletions (i.e. Stocks C and D) exceeds the number of Type-1
additions (i.e. Stock A). Without the Type-1 mismatch Stock B would not be
added to the FTSE 100 and remain in the FTSE 250. After the review, the rank
band contains the 10 lowest-ranked FTSE 100 stocks, arbitrarily overlapping with
10
the 10 highest-ranked FTSE 250 stocks. In a review these 20 marginal stocks are
not turned over other than for balancing purposes.
1.3.2. Natural Experiment: Balancing Index Turnover
An important concern with many previous studies is, that they rely on time-series
variation in market capitalization rank and, thus, in index membership, which is
likely to be correlated with unobserved stock characteristics. Such index turnover
is not random and can create a selection bias.
Figure 1.2 illustrates that index turnover is highest when markets are volatile
(Dimson and Marsh (2001)). Moreover, comovement varies greatly over time:
the largest change in comovement coincides with the Internet bubble and the
subsequent crash, a period when expectations about stock fundamentals changed
substantially (Table 1.5). It is therefore entirely possible that a change in unob-
served stock characteristics causes a concurrent change in comovement and index
turnover.
Whether or not there really is correlation between stock characteristics and
index turnover depends on the specic rules governing index membership changes.
For most popular indices, including the FTSE 100, market value is an important
selection criterion. Marginal stocks just outside the index are therefore more likely
to be added if they experience increasing market value, or equivalently high stock
returns.
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A consequence of market capitalization-based index membership rules is that
additions have high recent stock returns. Figure 1.3 displays the cumulative ab-
normal returns3 for additions to the FTSE 100 index by type (Figure 1.4 shows
deletions). The chart demonstrates that Type-1 banding additions have a much
higher pre-event stock price increase than Type-2 balancing additions. The stock
price run-up, however, may occur because certain unobserved stock characteristics
have changed, altering the stocks systematic risk and comovement (Antón (2010)).
It therefore appears that index turnover does not cause a change in comovement,
but much rather the reverse e¤ect exists: a change in comovement, possibly cor-
related with unobserved stock characteristics, seems to cause index turnover.
In order to investigate the selection issue further, it is useful to analyze the
relationship between the change in comovement and stock return performance.
The change in comovement, commonly measured by stock beta, is most positive
for additions, which outperformed the index in strong markets (Table 1.6 ). It
therefore appears that stocks with a high increase in beta join the index when
markets rally. This group includes rms that increase their systematic risk either
by adding leverage or by entering riskier businesses when stock markets perform
well. Stocks that experience a change in comovement therefore seem to self-select
into the index.
3The event study analysis uses daily returns over a 250-day window ending (starting) 10 trading
days before (after) the index turnover announcement date to estimate the pre-(post-)event single-
factor market model. Normal returns for the pre-(post-)event are calculated using the pre-(post-)
event estimates for alpha and beta.
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The FTSE 100 balancing rule can be used to eliminate the self-selection e¤ect.
The FTSE rules generate Type-2 balancing index turnover that is driven by market
capitalization changes of other stocks. Unlike Type-1 banding additions, Type-
2 balancing index turnover is not solely caused by the stocks own stock price
appreciation. However, in order to move to the top of the list of candidates for
balancing additions, the stock must also experience a moderate run-up. Figure
1.3 shows that Type-2 balancing additions have also appreciated, but less than
Type-1 banding additions. The moderate appreciation could nonetheless be caused
by a change in fundamental stock characteristics concurrently to an increase in
systematic risk.
However, since only market capitalization rank causes index turnover, con-
trolling Type-2 balancing turnover for market capitalization rank eliminates the
run-up bias. Conditional on rank, stocks located inside the FTSE 100 band are
therefore assigned randomly.
In other words, Type-1 banding index turnover is solely caused by the stocks
own return. Since fundamental stock characteristics, returns and market capital-
ization rank are likely to be correlated, stock fundamentals are also a¤ect Type-1
banding index turnover. Such non-random index turnover usually results in a se-
lection bias. In contrast, Type-2 balancing index turnover is not only caused by
the stocks own return but also by other stocks. Since the partial e¤ect of the
stocks own return can be eliminated by controlling for market capitalization rank,
13
conditional Type-2 balancing index turnover is random. Tests involving condi-
tional Type-2 balancing index turnover are therefore unbiased and have a causal
interpretation.
1.4. Tests
I present four models to test the e¤ect of index turnover on comovement: a
univariate regression, a bivariate regression, a standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences
(DID) analysis, and a DID model with matching. The exposition starts with
the two models used in the previous literature before moving to the two DID
approaches that generate my main results.
1.4.1. Univariate Regression
Comovement is commonly measured by the regression coe¢ cient beta of stock
returns on index returns. A simple benchmark to evaluate the e¤ect of index
turnover on comovement is to separately estimate the stocks beta before and
after each turnover event and to analyze the average change (Vijh (1994)). This
di¤erence is attractive because it provides an estimate of the index turnover e¤ect
on comovement that is not a¤ected by the stockstime-invariant characteristics.
For each index turnover event, I estimate the univariate regression model
(1.1) Ri;t = i + iR100;t + i;t
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separately before and after each index turnover event, and note the change in
beta i. Ri;t is the stocks total return between date t   1 and t, and R100;t
is the corresponding total adjusted return on the FTSE 100 index4. The daily
returns are over a 250-day period ending (starting) 10 trading days before (after)
the index turnover announcement date. The average change in beta is  and use
I bootstrap simulations in order to compute heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors.
1.4.2. Bivariate Regression
A shortcoming of the univariate analysis is that it only measures the e¤ect of entry
into one index, or the exit from another, but not both simultaneously. Barberis
et al. (2005) present a bivariate analysis to test the prediction that a stock moving
from one index to another becomes less sensitive to the former and more sensitive
to the latter. In the present analysis, the adjusted FT All Share index5 serves as
a proxy for non-FTSE 100 returns. For each index addition and deletion event, I
estimate the bivariate regression
(1.2) Ri;t = i + i;100R100;t + i;ASRAS;t + i;t
4FTSE 100 returns are adjusted by excluding the market capitalization-weighted return of stock
i after (before) the stock is added to (deleted from) the index.
5FTSE All Share returns are adjusted by excluding the market capitalization-weighted return of
the FTSE 100 stocks and the return of stock i after (before) the stock is added to (deleted from)
the index.
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before and after each event, and record the change in betas, i;100, and i;AS.
Ri;t is the stocks total return, R100;t is the total adjusted return of the FTSE 100
index, and RAS;t is the total adjusted return of the FT All Share index, between
time t   1 and t, respectively. The daily returns are again over a 250-day period
ending (starting) 10 trading days before (after) the event announcement date. The
average change in betas are 100 and AS and I again bootstrap in order to
compute heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
1.4.3. Standard Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences
A potential drawback of the univariate and bivariate models is that they determine
only the change in comovement for index turnover stocks, but do not control for
contemporaneous changes in non-turnover stocks. These models cannot distinguish
a change in comovement specic to index turnover stocks from a more general
market trend in comovement. A common solution to this problem is using a
standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) analysis relative to a control group. I
estimate the e¤ect of index turnover on the change in beta using the model
(1.3) Posti;q   Prei;q = r + q + + Turnoveri;q + "i;q.
The left-hand side is the change in beta for rm i around the index review during
quarter q. Prei;q and 
Post
i;q are the pre- and post-review estimates of beta from
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Equation (1.1), collapsed into one observation. r is a rank-xed e¤ect and q is
a quarter-xed e¤ect. The coe¢ cient  is the average change between post- and
pre-review beta and the coe¢ cient  is the average change in beta between
index turnover and non-turnover stocks. Turnoveri;q is an indicator variable for
FTSE 100 index turnover of stock i in quarter q. The control group for index
additions are the FTSE 250 stocks, and for deletions I use the FTSE 100 stocks.
The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
Specication (1.3) is rst-di¤erenced and eliminates any time-invariant unob-
served heterogeneity of stocks. This is equivalent to including stock-xed e¤ects
in a panel estimation and the estimates are therefore attained from the changes in
the dependent variable for the same stock.
A key requirement in regression analyses of this type is that index turnover must
be uncorrelated with the change in comovement. This assumption is challenging
because unobserved stock characteristics correlated with comovement can indeed
cause index turnover and introduce a selection bias.
The standard DIDmodel uses market capitalization rank-xed e¤ects to control
for non-randomness in index turnover. The joint null hypothesis is therefore rstly,
that markets are weak-form e¢ cient in that market capitalization is a su¢ cient
statistic for index turnover, and secondly, that index turnover has no e¤ect on
comovement. The alternative hypothesis is either that markets are not weak-form
e¢ cient or that index turnover does have an e¤ect on comovement.
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1.4.4. Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences with Matching
Another remedy for non-random index turnover is matching. Within the FTSE
rank band from 91 to 110, there is random overlap between Type-2 balancing index
turnover stocks and non-turnover stocks, and also between index and non-index
stocks. Type-2 balancing index turnover stocks can therefore be matched by rank
with non-turnover stocks in order to eliminate the selection bias. I estimate the
model
(1.4) Posti;q   Prei;q = q + + Turnoveri;q + "i;q.
by matching each Type-2 index turnover stock with a sample of non-turnover
stocks with the same index membership status that fall into a dened market
capitalization rank bandwidth. This method provides a consistent estimator for
the causal e¤ect of balancing index turnover on comovement because, conditional
on market capitalization rank, index turnover is random and there is overlap
(Wooldridge (2010), pp. 934).
This analysis uses matching by rank interval in order to control for residual
non-randomness in Type-2 balancing index turnover. As before, the joint null
hypothesis is that markets are weak-form e¢ cient in that market capitalization
is a su¢ cient statistic for index turnover and that index turnover has no e¤ect
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on comovement. The alternative hypothesis is that markets are not weak-form
e¢ cient or index turnover does have an e¤ect on comovement.
1.5. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Historical FTSE6 index members from December 1985 through December 2012
are collected manually from Brumwell (2003) and FTSE. Index membership in-
formation is combined with daily stock prices from Compustat Global, LSPD and
Datastream. All eligible stocks are ranked by market capitalization at the quar-
terly FTSE review dates in March, June, September, and December. An index
turnover event occurs when a stocks addition to or deletion from the FTSE 100
is announced. Stocks with a history of less than 60 trading days before or after an
index turnover event are excluded.
FTSE 100 index turnover falls into four categories: ordinary banding (Type-1),
ordinary balancing (Type-2), extra-ordinary turnover (Type-3), and extra-ordinary
balancing (Type-4).
6The sample includes the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 index members, which jointly form the FTSE
350 index. The FTSE 250 started in October 1992. Prior to that date the 250 largest members
of the FTSE All Share index were used.
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Table 1.1 displays index turnover by type. This study focuses on Type-1 band-
ing and Type-2 balancing index turnover7: Type-1 banding represents 169 addi-
tions and 186 deletions, and Type-2 balancing accounts for 59 additions and 71
deletions.
Figure 1.2 presents the evolution of Type-1 and Type-2 index turnover over
time. Type-1 banding index turnover is clustered in periods of high stock market
volatility. Type-2 balancing index turnover depends on the di¤erence between
Type-1 additions and deletions and appears more stable over time.
Table 1.2 shows the empirical probability of Type-2 balancing index turnover
by market capitalization rank and index membership status. Market capitaliza-
tion rank and past index membership fully determine Type-1 banding and Type-2
balancing index turnover. The di¤erence between the number of Type-1 banding
additions and deletions and the proximity to the rank band inuence the likeli-
hood of Type-2 balancing turnover. As expected, the closer the rank of non-index
stocks to the cut-o¤ at 91, the higher the probability of a Type-2 balancing index
addition. Accordingly, the closer the rank of an index member to the threshold at
110, the greater the likelihood of a Type-2 balancing index deletion.
Table 1.3 displays the estimated probability of Type-2 balancing index turnover
by lagged position. Position is the Type-1 imbalance required to shift a marginal
7Type 3 extra-ordinary turnover is excluded because most time-series are shorter than 60 trading
days. I also exclude Type 4 extra-ordinary balancing turnover because it can be anticipated by
investors and is therefore unlikely to be random: index additions are from a reserve list that is
announced at the previous quarterly review.
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stock into becomingType-2 index turnover. Position is used to estimate the like-
lihood of Type-2 index turnover based on information available on the day before
the quarterly review. The table shows that the highest-ranked marginal non-index
stock on the day before a review has a 20:6 percent chance of a Type-2 shift into
the index, while the lowest-ranked marginal index stock faces a 26:5 percent proba-
bility of a Type-2 deletion from the index. Type-2 balancing turnover is negatively
correlated with past index returns, indicating that balancing is less likely in volatile
markets. After controlling for lagged rank, however, Type-2 index additions can
no longer be predicted by lagged position or past index returns and appear to be
random. Market capitalization rank therefore seems to be a su¢ cient statistic for
Type-2 balancing additions.
Table 1.4 displays the characteristics for marginal stocks. Stocks experiencing
Type-2 balancing index turnover should have the same characteristics as those
that do not. In Panel A, Type-2 index additions display no signicant di¤erence
in pre-event alpha, beta, and stock returns from other stocks in the FTSE rank
band. However, Panel B shows that Type-2 deletions have a signicantly lower
alpha and stock return than other stocks in the band. The results in Panel A are
consistent with conditional Type-2 balancing index additions being uncorrelated
with stock characteristics.
Table 1.5 displays the change in comovement, measured by univariate change in
stock beta, around FTSE 100 index turnover by period. The index turnover e¤ect
on beta is time-varying and is stronger for index additions than for deletions. It
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grows from insignicant, from 1986 to 1988, and reaches a peak between 1995 and
2000. For the years from 1988 to 2000 the change in beta is 0:349 for FTSE 100
index additions. The increase in and the level of excess comovement are consistent
with the analysis of Barberis et al. (2005) for the S&P 5008. The S&P 500 and
the FTSE 100 indices therefore seem to produce similar results.
The magnitude of the e¤ect declines considerably during recent years. Table 1.5
shows that between 2007 and 2012, the change in beta falls to 0.181 for additions
and becomes insignicant for deletions.
Table 1.6 shows the change in comovement for stock return performance groups.
The change in beta is most positive for additions that outperformed the index in
strong markets. When stock markets advance these stocks that outperform are
the most likely to be added to the index. Stocks with high increases in beta are
therefore added to the index when markets rally. Hence, stocks that experience a
change in comovement seem to self-select into the index.
1.6. Main Results
1.6.1. Univariate Regression
The basic univariate model is an intuitive initial reference point.
Table 1.7 presents the univariate change in beta for index turnover by type.
In Panel A, Column 2 indicates that all index additions have comparable levels of
8For S&P 500 index additions, the univariate change in beta is 0:067 from 1976 to 1987 and
increases to 0:214 between 1988 and 2000.
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beta before turnover. However, Column 4 shows that for additions the change in
beta di¤ers considerably: while Type-1 banding additions experience an increase
by 0:313, Type-2 balancing additions display only a change of 0:111. Panel B
shows no such di¤erence for deletions: Type-1 banding deletions have a change in
beta of  0:152 versus  0:156 for Type-2 balancing deletions.
Table 1.7, Panel A demonstrates that Type-2 balancing eliminates part of the
selection problem and reduces the e¤ect of index addition on beta by more than
half. As explained in Section 1.3.2, the remainder is removed by conditioning
on market capitalization rank. However, the univariate model uses only index
turnover stocks and by design excludes stocks that experience no turnover. But
eliminating the e¤ect of market capitalization rank requires the use of all stocks, i.e.
index turnover and non-index turnover stocks, because otherwise the e¤ects of rank
and of index turnover cannot be identied separately. Moreover, the univariate
model does not account for general trends in the change in beta. The univariate
estimates for Type-2 balancing index turnover are therefore likely to contain an
upward (downward) bias resulting from the pre-event increase (decrease) in stock
prices for index additions (deletions).
1.6.2. Bivariate Regression
The bivariate model permits a more powerful test of the fundamentals-based hy-
pothesis. It tests simultaneously whether index turnover stocks become less sensi-
tive to the index they leave and more sensitive to the index they join.
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Table 1.8 displays the bivariate change in beta for index turnover by type.
Columns 3 and 4 show that turnover stocks indeed experience increases in beta
with the index they join, and the converse with the index they leave. Column 2 and
3 show that, consistent with Barberis et al. (2005)9, the bivariate coe¢ cients for
the FTSE 100 are greater than the univariate coe¢ cients. However, just as in the
univariate model, the change in beta for the FTSE 100 di¤ers by index turnover
type: Type-1 banding additions show a signicant increase by 0:581, while Type-2
balancing additions display only a change by 0:272. The change in beta is  0:556
for Type-1 banding deletions, whereas it is  0:397 for Type-2 balancing deletions.
Similar to in the univariate case, Type-2 balancing reduces the e¤ect of index
addition on beta by approximately half. The remainder cannot be eliminated by
conditioning on rank because its e¤ect on comovement is not separately identied.
Furthermore, the bivariate model also fails to account for general trends in the
change in beta. The bivariate tests are therefore also biased.
Summarizing the results so far, the uni- and bivariate models both show that
using Type-2 balancing reduces the e¤ect of index addition on beta by at least
half. However, without a good control for market capitalization rank these models
cannot eliminate the remaining selection bias and are likely to overstate the index
turnover e¤ect on comovement.
9Unlike Barberis et al. (2005), my results show no signs of collinearity between the adjusted
returns on the FTSE 100 and the FT All Share indices.
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1.6.3. Standard Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences
The standard di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DID) analysis estimates the change in beta
specic to index turnover relative to the change for non-turnover stocks. Further-
more, the rst-di¤erencing on the left-hand-side of Equation (1.3) removes any
time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity of stocks. Moreover, controlling for mar-
ket capitalization rank eliminates the remainder of the selection bias for Type-2
balancing index turnover.
Table 1.9 displays the di¤erence in di¤erences in beta for FTSE 100 index
turnover. The coe¢ cient  is the average change between post- and pre-review
beta and the coe¢ cient  is the average change in beta between index turnover
and non-turnover stocks.
Panel A presents the standard DID results for index additions. Column 3
displays a change in beta for Type-1 banding additions of 0:252, and Column 5
shows that for Type-2 balancing additions the corresponding change in beta is
0:122. Quarter-xed e¤ects eliminate any change in beta that is common across
all stocks during a quarter. Column 6 shows that the change in beta for Type-2
balancing additions increases to 0:158, indicating that such turnover coincides with
a general decline in beta.
Panel B exhibits the equivalent results for index deletions. Column 3 shows a
change in beta for Type-1 banding deletions of  0:0822, and Column 5 displays
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a change in beta of  0:0922 for Type-2 balancing deletions. The e¤ect of index
deletions again appears to be weaker than for additions.
To identify the causal e¤ect of index turnover on comovement, the remaining
selection bias in Type-2 balancing turnover must be removed. Since FTSE index
turnover is determined exclusively by market capitalization rank, using rank-xed
e¤ects makes index turnover ignorable (Wooldridge (2010), p. 908). Introducing
rank-xed e¤ects eliminates the remaining selection bias for Type-2 index bal-
ancing stocks due to the overlap between index turnover and non-index turnover
stocks within the FTSE rank band.
In Panel A, Column 7 demonstrates that the change in beta for Type-2 index
balancing additions becomes insignicant when rank-xed e¤ects are added. Col-
umn 8 conrms that the change in beta for Type-2 index balancing additions is
also insignicant when quarter-xed e¤ects are included.
Panel B shows a di¤erent result for index deletions. Column 7 and 8 demon-
strate that Type-2 balancing and rank-xed e¤ects do not materially alter the
e¤ect of index deletion on comovement. Unlike index addition, FTSE 100 index
deletion seems to have a weak negative causal e¤ect on comovement.
Type-2 balancing index turnover controlled for market capitalization rank pro-
duces unbiased results. Table 1.9 shows that when this approach is used, the e¤ect
of FTSE 100 index addition on comovement disappears.
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1.6.4. Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences with Matching
Matching is an alternative approach to eliminate the selection bias in index turnover.
I take advantage of the overlap between Type-2 balancing stocks and non-turnover
stocks within the rank band. Table 1.2 shows that Type-2 balancing additions
are usually ranked between 91 and 100. The closest matches that remain outside
the FTSE 100 are therefore FTSE 250 stocks ranked between 91 and 100. These
stocks form the control group for index additions. For index deletions, the control
group are FTSE 100 stocks ranked between 101 and 110.
Table 1.10 presents the di¤erence in di¤erences in beta for Type-2 balancing
additions with matching. As before,  is the average change between post- and
pre-review beta and  is the average change in beta between index turnover
and non-turnover stocks.
For additions, Panel A, Column 1 shows an insignicant change in beta for
Type-2 balancing with matching. In Column 2, quarter-xed e¤ects do not ma-
terially alter the result: the change in beta for Type-2 balancing additions with
matching is 0:0685 and remains insignicant.
For deletions, Panel B, Columns 1 and 2 show that the change in beta is
economically small and weakly signicant.
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Matching Type-2 balancing index turnover on market capitalization rank pro-
duces unbiased results. Consistent with the previous analysis, Table 1.10 demon-
strates that this method equally eliminates the e¤ect of FTSE 100 index addition
on comovement.
In summary, both the standard DID controlled for market capitalization rank
and the DID analysis with matching by rank produce consistent and unbiased
results for Type-2 balancing index turnover. For both approaches the e¤ect of
FTSE 100 index addition on comovement is insignicant. Samples using non-
random index turnover seem to create a substantial upward selection bias that
overstates the index turnover e¤ect on comovement. In the present sample of FTSE
100 index additions, I fail to nd evidence for excess comovement and therefore
cannot reject the fundamentals-based hypothesis of stock markets.
1.7. Robustness
1.7.1. Placebo Index Test
Section 1.6 demonstrates that non-random FTSE 100 Type-1 banding additions
experience a signicant increase in comovement, while random Type-2 balancing
additions, conditional on market capitalization rank, do not. If the index rules are
really the cause for non-random additions and the comovement e¤ect observed in
the FTSE 100, then applying these rules to a ctional placebo index should lead
to the same e¤ect. However, tests that show a signicant change in comovement
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for additions to an index that does not exist are false rejections: the actual market
should not react to a ctional index turnover event.
The placebo index is constructed of 200 members that are selected by market
capitalization rank from the universe of FTSE 350 stocks. The Placebo 200 is
rebalanced quarterly, equivalently to the FTSE 100: Stocks crossing either border
of the market capitalization rank band from 181 to 220 are classied Type-1 band-
ing index turnover; Type-2 balancing occurs when stocks inside the rank band are
shifted into or out of the placebo index.
Table 1.11 presents the standard DID analysis of beta for Placebo 200 index
turnover. The average di¤erence between post- and pre-review beta is , and be-
tween index turnover and non-turnover stocks is . Panel A, Column 3 shows
that the change in beta for Type-1 banding additions is 0:165 and signicant. In
contrast, Column 7 and 8 demonstrate that the Type-2 balancing turnover, con-
ditional on market capitalization rank, has no signicant e¤ect on beta. Since the
Placebo 200 is ctional and there is no actual index turnover; the Type-2 balanc-
ing sample correctly detects no e¤ect, and the Type-1 banding sample incorrectly
reports a change in beta that is caused by non-random sample selection. Panel B
shows that the change in beta for all types of deletions is insignicant. Since the
test correctly nds no e¤ect for any sample, there seems to be no general selection
issue for index deletions.
Table 1.12 shows the results for DID with matching for Type-2 balancing ad-
ditions to the Placebo 200. The average di¤erence between post- and pre-review
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beta is , and between index turnover and non-turnover stocks is . How-
ever, now the matching restricts the sample to stocks ranked between 181 and 220.
As expected, the e¤ect of addition to (Panel A) and deletion from (Panel B) the
Placebo 200 index are insignicant, as in the case of the standard DID analysis.
The placebo index tests indicate that the observed change in comovement for
index additions can be attributed to membership rules that generate a severe
selection issue. In contrast, index deletions do not seem to create non-random
samples.
1.7.2. Non-Synchronous Trading
A non-synchronous trading bias occurs when stocks trade infrequently and no
longer incorporate market information in a timely fashion; this was rst docu-
mented by Scholes and Williams (1977). In such cases, comovement simply in-
creases because a stock is added to a major index and trades more frequently
after inclusion. I use a test suggested by Vijh (1994) and adopted by Barberis
et al. (2005) to test, if non-synchronous trading might also cause a change in
comovement. The sample is divided into two parts: stocks whose average trading
volume decreases after inclusion into the index, and those whose trading volume
increases. If non-synchronous trading accounts for these results, then comovement
should only increase for stocks whose trading volume also increases. Comovement
for stocks whose trading volume decreases, however, should not be a¤ected by a
non-synchronous trading bias.
30
Table 1.13 accordingly presents a standard DID analysis of the change in beta
for index turnover stocks whose trading volume decreases. Panel A displays the
results for index additions. Columns 7 and 8 display that, after controlling for
quarter and rank-xed e¤ects, the change in comovement for Type-2 additions
with decreased trading remains insignicant .
Panel B exhibits index deletions. Similarly, Column 7 and 8 show that Type-2
deletions with decreased trading volume experience no signicant change in co-
movement, after controlling for quarter and rank-xed e¤ects. The magnitude of
the results for Type-2 index turnover in Table 1.13 resemble the estimates in Table
1.9, indicating that asynchronous trading does not materially a¤ect the results.
1.7.3. Excluding Turnover Stocks from Index
If either index additions or deletions are highly correlated with each other at the
time of turnover, then a bias could arise. The change in comovement would be
overstated because a turnover stock would be highly correlated with all other
stocks either added to or deleted from the index. The potential bias is therefore
eliminated by excluding all turnover stocks from the FTSE 100 index around the
review date. Since portfolio betas are weighted averages of stock beta, I adjust
the previous beta estimates by subtracting the weighted betas of index turnover
stocks.
Table 1.14 displays the di¤erence in di¤erences in beta for FTSE 100 index
turnover, where turnover stocks are excluded from the index. Panel A presents
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index additions and Panel B deletions. Across the board the regression coe¢ cients
are very close to those in Table 1.9, indicating that correlation between index
turnover stocks does not materially a¤ect the results.
1.8. Conclusion
With noise-trader sentiment and market frictions, forced institutional buying
creates a demand shock when stocks are added to or deleted from an index. These
shocks could create comovement in stock returns that exceeds that explained by
common news about fundamentals, like future cash ows and discount rates. If
investors are rational and there are no limits to arbitrage, then events that contain
no news about stock fundamentals should have no e¤ect on comovement.
This paper takes advantage of the FTSE 100 index banding policy, which
contains a balancing rule that, after controlling for market capitalization rank,
generates random index turnover stocks. Using this sample of stocks, I nd no
signicant e¤ect of index turnover on comovement and, hence, cannot reject the
fundamentals-based hypothesis.
These ndings are in contrast to previous studies that observe a large e¤ect
of index turnover on comovement. However, these studies rely on variation in in-
dex membership that is unlikely to be random. In fact, I nd that non-random
turnover generated from a simulated placebo index generates a false e¤ect on co-
movement. Therefore, index turnover does not cause a change in comovement,
but the reverse e¤ect exists: a change in comovement, possibly correlated with
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unobserved stock characteristics, causes index turnover. This non-randomness can
create a substantial selection bias and lead to incorrect inferences.
Using random balancing index turnover is a method that holds promise for the
analysis of asset markets phenomena where selection issues are a concern.
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1.9. Figures
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Figure 1.1: FTSE 100 Index Balancing Policy
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Figure 1.2: Additions to and Deletions from FTSE 100 Index by Quarter
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Figure 1.3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Additions to FTSE 100 Index
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Figure 1.4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Deletions from FTSE 100 Index
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Figure 1.5: Change in Average Beta of Stocks Added to the FTSE 100 Index
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Figure 1.6: Change in Average Beta for Stocks Deleted from FTSE 100 Index
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Figure 1.2
Additions to and deletions from the FTSE 100 index by quarter. The sample includes
all FTSE 100 index members from December 1985 until December 2012. The sample
also includes the FTSE 250 index members (from October 1992, and the 250 largest
members of the FTSE All Share index for prior dates), which, together with the FTSE
100, form the FTSE 350 index. An index turnover event occurs when a stock is added to
or deleted from the FTSE 100. The FTSE 100 index turnover information is combined
with daily stock market information from Compustat Global and Datastream. Stock
with less than 60 days of price data before and after the index turnover announcement
date are excluded. At each quarterly review date, all eligible stocks are ranked by market
capitalization according to FTSE rules and double-checked with LSPD data. Then, I
classify index turnover into four categories: Type-1 are additions ranked 90 or better
or deletions ranked 111 or worse at a quarterly review. Type-2 are ranked between 91
and 110 at a quarterly review but added to or deleted from the index for balancing
purposes. Type-3 are extra-ordinary additions and deletions between quarterly review
dates. Type-4 are additions from the reserve list to the index (deletions from the index)
to balance extra-ordinary deletions (additions).
Figure 1.3
Cumulative abnormal returns of stocks added to the FTSE 100 index. The sample
includes stocks added to from the FTSE 100 index between 1985 and 2012 which have
su¢ cient data. For each stock i, I estimate the market model separately in the pre-
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and post-index turnover period Ri;t = i + iR100;t + i;t where Ri;t is the stock return
between date t   1 and t, and R100;t is the corresponding return on the FTSE 100 in-
dex, with stock i excluded after being added to (before being deleted from) the index.
The pre- and post-turnover estimation periods are [-260, -10] and [10, 260] trading days
around the event. The stocks are grouped by index turnover type, as dened in Section
2.
Figure 1.4
Cumulative abnormal returns of stocks deleted from the FTSE 100 index. The sample
includes stocks added to from the FTSE 100 index between 1985 and 2012 which have
su¢ cient data. For each stock i, I estimate the market model separately in the pre-
and post-index turnover period Ri;t = i + iR100;t + i;t where Ri;t is the stock return
between date t   1 and t, and R100;t is the corresponding return on the FTSE 100 in-
dex, with stock i excluded after being added to (before being deleted from) the index.
The pre- and post-turnover estimation periods are [-260, -10] and [10, 260] trading days
around the event. The stocks are grouped by index turnover type, as dened in Section
2.
Figure 1.5
Change in average beta for stocks added to the FTSE 100 index. The sample in-
cludes stocks added to the FTSE 100 index between 1985 and 2012 which have suf-
cient data. For each stock i, I use a 250-day rolling estimate of the market model
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Ri;t = i + iR100;t + i;t where Ri;t is the stock return between date t   1 and t, and
R100;t is the corresponding return on the FTSE 100 index, with stock i excluded after
being added to (before being deleted from) the index. The coe¢ cients are averaged by
index turnover type, as dened in Section 2. The bands represent the 10% and the 90%
condence intervals.
Figure 1.6
Change in average beta for stocks deleted from the FTSE 100 index. The sample
includes stocks deleted from the FTSE 100 index between 1985 and 2012 which have
su¢ cient data. For each stock i, I use a 250-day rolling estimate of the market model
Ri;t = i + iR100;t + i;t where Ri;t is the stock return between date t   1 and t, and
R100;t is the corresponding return on the FTSE 100 index, with stock i excluded after
being added to (before being deleted from) the index. The coe¢ cients are averaged by
index turnover type, as dened in Section 2. The bands represent the 10% and the 90%
condence intervals.
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CHAPTER 2
Do Chair Independence and Succession Planning Inuence
CEO Turnover?
2.1. Abstract
There is widespread concern that corporate boards do not su¢ ciently punish
chief executive o¢ cers (CEOs) for poor performance. Board e¤ectiveness in ousting
CEOs may be a¤ected by chief executives who also chair the board or inuence
the succession planning process. This article explores how chair independence
and succession planning inuence CEO turnover. I address endogeneity issues
using a trinomial probit regression system of CEO turnover that models chair
independence and succession planning endogenously.
I nd that succession planning has a larger positive e¤ect on CEO turnover
than suggested by previous research. I also nd that chair independence actually
reduces the probability of succession planning because it creates a friction with
the common relay succession model. There is a negative overall e¤ect of chair
independence on CEO turnover.
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2.2. Introduction
There is widespread concern that corporate boards do not su¢ ciently punish
chief executive o¢ cers (CEOs) for poor performance. This may be caused by
CEO entrenchment where boards retain chief executives who shareholders would
rather see red. Board e¤ectiveness in ousting CEOs may be a¤ected by chief
executives who also chair the board (CEO duality) or inuence the succession
planning process. Empirical research shows that CEO turnover is less sensitive to
poor stock returns when rms have dual CEO-chairs (Dahya et al. (2002), Goyal
and Park (2002)), and that the likelihood of turnover decreases when rms have
no succession plan and no heir apparent is available (Naveen (2006)). Accordingly,
corporate governance rules were established to encourage boards to separate the
chief executive role from the chairperson1 and to introduce succession planning
procedures2. However, an important issue with these studies is that they generally
rely on variation in corporate decision variables, which is unlikely to be random.
1On December 16, 2009, the SEC announced a rule (SEC Release No. 33-9089; 34-61175;
http://www.sec.gov/rules/nal/2009/33-9089.pdf) that requires listed companies to disclose the
board leadership structure, including whether the rm has combined the CEO and chairperson
position, and explain why such a leadership structure is appropriate.
2On October 27, 2009, the SEC eliminated the ordinary business exclusion defense (SEC Release
No. 33-9089; 34-61175; http://www.sec.gov/rules/nal/2009/33-9089.pdf) employed by rms
unable or unwilling to disclose their CEO succession planning process to shareholders. In chang-
ing its prior view, the SEC recognized that inadequate CEO succession planning represents an
important business risk and ags a rms governance policy issue that goes beyond daily man-
agement of the rm. Succession planning is considered "a key board function and a signicant
policy (and governance) issue . . . so that a company is not adversely a¤ected by a vacancy in
leadership."
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In particular, endogeneity in chair independence and succession planning cannot
be ruled out and standard regression results may be biased.
In this article, I explore how chair independence and succession planning a¤ect
CEO turnover by improving corporate governance and reducing entrenchment. I
address concerns regarding simultaneity and omitted variables in chair indepen-
dence and succession planning by using a trivariate probit system to estimate the
e¤ect on CEO turnover. Firms execute their succession plans by appointing an heir
apparent to the board of directors, usually a separate President, Chief Operating
O¢ cer, or Vice Chair. I nd that such succession planning increases the proba-
bility of CEO turnover by at least 20%. When there are no succession candidates
some chief executives are retained even though shareholders may prefer to have
them replaced. Succession planning therefore seems to reduce CEO entrenchment
by eliminating a friction to turnover.
The trivariate probit system permits a chair independence e¤ect on succession
planning and I nd a signicantly negative correlation. This may be caused by the
common relay succession model, where CEO duality (no independence) coincides
with an heir apparent (succession planning). The overall e¤ect of chair indepen-
dence is therefore negative and reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover by 4%. This
unexpected result may arise because the positive e¤ect of improved monitoring by
independent chairs is exceeded by the frictions arising from fewer relay succes-
sions. Chair independence does not seem to reduce CEO entrenchment enough to
compensate for the reduction in heirs apparent by barring relay successions.
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I address concerns regarding unobserved managerial ability by selecting sam-
ples of natural retirements and forced turnover. CEO ability cannot be directly
observed, but corporate boards learn it over time until it becomes a known quan-
tity (Taylor (2010)). CEOs who survive board scrutiny until retirement age are
therefore likely to have high average ability while CEOs who are forced to leave
earlier most likely have low average ability (Fee et al. (2010)). I nd that coe¢ -
cient estimates are consistent across these samples and conclude that a bias caused
by unobserved CEO ability is unlikely.
This article supports corporate governance rule changes that enhance succession
planning but provides no evidence for policies that promote chair independence.
The literature on CEO turnover is well established and rooted in corporate
governance theory. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), and
Jensen and Ruback (1983), agency theory predicts that the separation of corpo-
rate ownership from control encourages managers to maximize private benets and
decrease shareholder value. Such managerial behavior is typically blamed on the
unwillingness or inability of corporate boards to e¤ectively exercise their role as
shareholder representatives. Fama and Jensen (1983) show that ine¤ective cor-
porate governance emerges from boards dominated by rm managers. Weisbach
(1988) observes that manager-dominated boards are less likely to dismiss CEOs for
poor rm performance. Chair independence has come under particular scrutiny.
Agency theory suggests that chair and CEO roles be separated in order to increase
board independence and enable better oversight. Consistent with agency theory,
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Goyal and Park (2002) and Dahya et al. (2002) show that chair independence
increases the likelihood of turnover with respect to rm performance.
Parrino (1997) suggests that rms evaluate trade-o¤s in turnover and succes-
sion decisions. The potential benet of replacing a chief executive with a successor
increases with the expected improvement in match quality between rm require-
ments and executive characteristics, but decreases with uncertainty in measuring
these characteristics and xed costs of CEO turnover. Taylor (2010) shows that
corporate boards learn unobservable CEO ability over time until it becomes a
know quantity. Vancil (1987) focuses on CEO succession planning and nds that
relay successions are a common pattern. The rm selects an heir apparent several
years before the CEOs anticipated retirement date, the heir apparent and out-
going chief executive work together until the CEO leaves, and the retiring CEO
remains chairperson for a few years before also transferring chairmanship to the
successor. Dual CEO-chairs are therefore a normal stage during the common relay
succession cycle. Naveen (2006) revisits succession planning and nds that many
U.S. rms use a relay process for inside successions. The departing CEOs age also
plays an important role in top executive changes. Murphy (1999) documents that
most CEO turnover relates to natural retirements.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2.3 develops testable hypotheses.
Section 2.4 discusses the empirical strategy. The sample and descriptive statistics
are presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 shows the main results, and Section 2.7
concludes.
64
2.3. Hypotheses
Corporate governance theory suggests that chair independence reduces CEO
entrenchment and therefore has a positive e¤ect on CEO turnover. Empirical
research shows that succession planning also has a positive e¤ect on CEO turnover.
However, chair independence is related to succession planning and therefore has
an indirect e¤ect on CEO turnover as well: relay successions require both an heir
apparent and a dual CEO-chair, who remains as dependent chair after the turnover
event. Since chair independence rules out the relay succession model, there may
also be fewer heirs apparent and less CEO turnover. Any positive direct e¤ect of
chair independence on CEO turnover could therefore be countered by a negative
indirect e¤ect from less e¤ective succession planning.
I motivate the test hypotheses for the e¤ect of chair independence and CEO
succession planning on turnover as well as their interaction. There are three hy-
potheses for testing how chair independence and succession planning, both directly
and indirectly, a¤ect CEO turnover.
Direct E¤ects (DE).
Chair independence decreases entrenchment. The dual role of a CEO-chair creates
conicts of interest. Such conict may arise because incentives to remain CEO are
strong and can lead to entrenchment. As chairperson of the board, CEO-chairs
may be able to inuence the board in their own turnover decisions as well as
inuence the boards succession planning process. Chief executives usually have
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superior information regarding candidate ability. CEO entrenchment strategies to
delay turnover and succession may include, for example, downplaying candidate
ability or ousting an heir apparent. Separating the chairperson from the chief
executive role eliminates these conicts of interest.
DE1: Chair independence makes CEO turnover more likely.
Succession planning facilitates inside successions. Firms engage in succession plan-
ning in order to facilitate managerial successions. An heir apparent is typically a
rm insider and designated successor to a retiring chief executive. The absence of
an heir apparent leaves only other less suitable inside or unknown outside succes-
sors, which might be more costly and risky. Succession planning that produces an
heir apparent should therefore increase the probability of turnover.
DE2: Succession planning makes CEO turnover more likely.
Indirect E¤ects (IE).
Relay successions require CEO duality. Relay successions are characterized by chief
executives taking the chairperson role and by boards selecting an heir apparent
prior to the management transition. The promotion of chief executives to dual
CEO-chairs typically takes place before the appointment of the heir apparent.
CEO duality usually precedes heir apparent in the relay succession cycle. Since
chair independence rules out the relay succession model there may also be fewer
heirs apparent.
IE: Chair independence makes succession planning less likely.
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These three hypotheses provide tests for both the overall e¤ect of chair inde-
pendence on CEO turnover (DE1) and the indirect e¤ect through the succession
planning channel (IE and DE2). These tests can be used to disentangle the di-
rect and indirect e¤ect of chair independence on CEO turnover and show which
dominates.
2.4. Empirical Strategy
Measuring the e¤ect of chair independence and succession planning on CEO
turnover is a challenge. The rms decisions on chair independence, succession
planning, and CEO turnover are made simultaneously. For example, if a rm de-
cides to use the common relay succession model (Vancil (1987)) then its succession
planning, chair independence, and CEO turnover are a¤ected at the same time:
an heir apparent is selected, the incumbent becomes dual CEO-chair, and a target
date is set to pass on the CEO title to the successor. Simultaneity can therefore
lead to endogeneity and inconsistent estimates.
Unobserved variables may also create endogeneity problems. For example,
CEO ability is di¢ cult to observe but inuences chair independence and succession
planning: a low ability chief executive is more likely to face an independent chair
and be replaced by an outside successor. Unobserved ability can therefore generate
further inconsistency.
The empirical approach must therefore address endogeneity from both simulta-
neous and unobserved variables. This problem lends itself to simultaneous systems
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estimation. My empirical strategy is therefore to estimate a recursive and fully ob-
served system of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) equations.
Following this general approach, Naveen (2006) uses a bivariate probit regres-
sion to estimate the e¤ect of one endogenous variable, succession planning, on
CEO turnover. However, the relay succession model is also characterized by CEO
duality, which is not part of her analysis. Therefore, I introduce a second endoge-
nous variable, chair independence, in order to better incorporate the e¤ect of relay
successions.
The resulting recursive trivariate binary choice model can be specied as a
system of SUR equations:
ChairIndt = 1[1Z1t + 2Z2t +Xt1 + "1t > 0](2.1)
HeirAppt = 1[2ChairIndt + 2Z2t +Xt2 + "2t > 0](2.2)
Turnovert = 1[3ChairIndt + 3HeirAppt +Xt3 + "3t > 0](2.3)
" = ("1; "2; "3)
0 s N (0;)(2.4)
 =
266664
1 : :
12 1 :
13 23 1
377775 ;(2.5)
where 1[] is the indicator function, X is a matrix of controls, ij reects the
correlation between the error terms "i and "j, and the dots refer to symmetrical
elements in the lower matrix part.
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Stage one (Eq. 2.1) denes the endogenous binary choice variable chair inde-
pendence. If the chair of the board during year t is neither the current nor a former
CEO of the rm, then the chairperson is independent and ChairIndt is set to 1.
Z1 and Z2 are instruments.
Stage two (Eq. 2.2) denes the endogenous binary choice variable heir apparent.
If the board of directors during year t includes a President, Chief Operating O¢ cer
(COO), or Vice Chair who is not the current CEO, then the rm has a succession
plan and HeirAppt is set to 1. Z2 is an instrument.
Stage three (Eq. 2.3) denes the endogenous binary choice variable CEO
turnover. If the CEO changes during year t, then the rm experiences a CEO
turnover event and Turnovert is set to 1.
The SUR system is recursive because in each stage the endogenous variables of
previous stages appear on the RHS: chair independence is an explanatory variable
for heir apparent, while both chair independence and heir apparent are explanatory
variables for CEO turnover. The SUR system is also fully observed: the endogenous
variables on the RHS (Eq. 2.2 and Eq. 2.3) are actual observations and not
estimates. This system permits correlation between the error terms in each stage
(Eq. 2.5).
The SUR system can be estimated consistently using limited information max-
imum likelihood (LIML). Consistency requires identically but not independently
distributed errors in each stage, and homoskedasticity in the nal stage. Wilde
(2000) shows that recursive multi-equation limited dependent variable models do
69
not require exclusion restrictions for parameter identication3. Therefore all stages,
except the nal one, do not need to be fully specied and can omit inuential vari-
ables.
Wooldridge (2010)4 cautions against relying solely on nonlinearity in multi-
variate probit models for parameter identication, and suggests to use exclusion
restrictions. It is therefore conservative to use two instruments with three exclusion
restrictions for the SUR system:
(1) Post-SOX indicator. The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) act, enacted in July
2002, enhances the oversight role of public company boards. It strength-
ens non-executive director independence, particularly for audit commit-
tees. SOX also increases chair independence and can be considered an
exogenous shock. However, the legislative scope does not cover succes-
sion planning and CEO turnover. The post-SOX indicator is therefore an
instrument for chair independence and can be excluded from the succes-
sion planning and CEO turnover equations. Any SOX e¤ect on succession
planning and CEO turnover is thus attributed to the chair independence
channel.
(2) Conditional candidate age indicator. Executives promoted to the exec-
utive board are succession candidates well before their o¢ cial selection
3Wilde (2000) proves that a single varying exogenous regressor per equation is su¢ cient to
eliminate problems with small variation identication in multi-equation probit models using
endogenous indicator variables.
4p. 599
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as heir apparent (Naveen (2006)). Candidates for heir apparent are also
usually younger than the incumbent CEO. Low candidate age increases
the likelihood of succession planning (heir apparent) and can be consid-
ered exogenous, after controlling for candidate availability. However, it is
not plausible that conditional candidate age has a direct e¤ect on CEO
turnover. Candidate age between 44 and 52, conditional on candidate
availability, is therefore an instrument for succession planning and chair
independence that can be excluded from the CEO turnover equation. Any
candidate age e¤ect on CEO turnover is accordingly attributed to the suc-
cession planning and chair independence channel.
These exclusion restrictions deliver an identied model. I estimate the SUR
system using simulated maximum likelihood methods based on the GHK algo-
rithm5.
2.4.1. Unobserved Ability
The e¤ect of managerial ability on board decisions could generally be eliminated
by conditioning on it. However, it is di¢ cult to directly observe executive ability
and there are no good proxies or instruments. My empirical strategy is therefore
to condition on managerial ability by selecting samples where executive ability is
likely to be similar.
5The GHK algorithm was developed independently by Geweke (1989), Hajivassiliou and McFad-
den (1998), and Keane (1994). It is implemented in Stata for general conditional mixed processes
with the user-written command cmp by Roodman (2011).
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Corporate boards receive various public and private signals in order to learn
unobservable managerial ability over time (Taylor (2010)). CEO survival is accord-
ingly related to ability: chief executives surviving board scrutiny long enough to
enter natural retirement should have high average ability, and those that are forced
out sooner should have low average ability (Weisbach (1988), Fee et al. (2010)).
I therefore select two samples that are likely to di¤er in CEO ability: natural re-
tirements with high CEO ability, and forced turnover with low CEO ability. If
the regression coe¢ cients are robust for di¤erent levels of CEO ability then a bias
caused by unobserved heterogeneity is unlikely.
2.5. Data
2.5.1. Sample Selection
The primary data source is BoardEx, which provides information on executive
management and non-executive board members by rm for the scal years from
1999 to 2008. The data set is merged with Compustat for accounting and stock
market information. The sample is restricted to non-nancial U.S. rms6 with a
minimum of $10 million in total assets where the chief executive is known at the
beginning and end of each scal year. Interim successors, identied by either the
title interim or acting chief executive or by a CEO tenure of less than one year,
are excluded. A turnover event occurs when the chief executive leaves the rm.
6SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 are excluded.
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After selecting the initial sample I categorize CEO turnover further by type.
I select news articles from Factiva that contain the name of each departing chief
executive during a two-year window around the turnover date to classify the likely
cause of the departure. Forced turnover and natural retirements are identied
according to the classication used by Parrino (1997). Forced turnover is selected
with the following procedure: rst, all turnover where a CEOs is reported to be
red is classied as forced. Second, all other turnover in which CEOs are under
age 60 are reviewed further. If the report does not mention that: (i) the exit is
health-related, (ii) the departing CEO either takes a new job in or outside the
rm, leaves for personal or other reasons unrelated to the rm, or (iii) the chief
executive departs in a natural retirement, then such turnover is also classied as
forced. Retirement is natural when a CEO retires and announces it at least six
months before leaving the rm.
Table 3.1 shows a panel data set with 25; 622 rm-years, 2; 250 rms, 4; 665 chief
executives, and 2; 790 CEO turnover events. Of these, 690 are natural retirements
and 1; 090 are forced CEO turnover.
Each turnover event typically comes with a succession. A relay succession is
a planned succession, characterized by an incoming CEO who was previously heir
apparent and a departing CEO who stays on as chairperson. An heir apparent is a
rm insider with a tenure of at least one year who is either president, chief operating
o¢ cer, or vice chairperson of the rm prior to the transition. Chair independence
is dened here as a chairperson who is neither the current nor a former chief
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executive. Relay succession and chair independence are mutually exclusive: relay
successions by denition require a CEO who stays on as chairperson, and therefore
the chair is not independent.
2.5.2. Descriptive Statistics
Since the BoardEx database is not widely used in CEO turnover research, I report
several key descriptive statistics for the sample.
Table 2.2 reports the distribution of CEO turnover by year. The overall annual
turnover rate is 10:9% and consistent with Parrino (1997), Naveen (2006), and Fee
et al. (2010). The average share of natural CEO retirements is 24:7% and the
average share of forced CEO turnover is 39:1%, the latter displaying an upward
trend.
Table 2.3 illustrates the industry distribution of CEO turnover using the Fama-
French 12-industry classication system7. While the turnover rate varies little
across industry sectors, the proportion of natural retirements and forced turnover
varies considerably across sectors, this most likely reects di¤erences in industry
maturity and competition.
Table 2.4 presents rm characteristics. Turnover events are preceded by low
operating and stock returns. Firm size, age, and homogeneity, along with the
proportion of non-executive board members are also correlated with CEO turnover.
7Denition of Fama-French 12-industry classication available at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
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Table 2.5 shows characteristics for incoming (Panel A) and outgoing CEOs
(Panel B). The average CEO successor is 51:8 years old and replaces a 58:2 year-old
predecessors after a tenure of 7:7 years. Overall 28:4% of outgoing chief executives
have an independent chair of the board and 44:2% appoint an heir apparent. For
natural retirements the average departure age is 59:4 years and CEO tenure is 7:2
years, 25:3% have an independent chairperson, and 44:9% have planned for their
succession with an heir apparent. For forced turnover the average exit age is 54:8
years and tenure is 6:1 years, 34:2% have an independent chair, and 32:8% have
an heir apparent.
Panel B also displays the succession type for departing chief executives. Relay
successions account for 23:3%, other inside successions for 41:7%, and outside
successions for 34:9% of all CEO turnover, respectively. Relay successions represent
only 10:6% but outside successions account for 40:7% of forced turnover.
Table 2.6 presents the prior title of the incoming and subsequent tile of the
outgoing CEO, respectively. Of the incoming CEOs 6:8% were CEO at another
rm, while 7:6% were chairperson, 40:4% president, 7:8% chief operating o¢ cer,
and 1:8% vice chair at the rm, respectively. Of the outgoing CEOs 37:1% stay
on as chairperson.
There is a close relationship between chair independence, succession planning
and CEO turnover.
Figure 2.1 presents the proportion of rms that have an independent chairper-
son, i.e. a chair who is neither the current nor a former CEO. This gure shows
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that chair independence is strongly correlated with CEO turnover. The increase
in chair independence around CEO turnover reects the fact that departing dual
CEO-chairs do not always become non-executive chairperson.
Figure 2.2 displays the share of rms that plan CEO successions by appointing
an heir apparent. It shows that succession planning is strongly correlated with
CEO turnover, particularly for natural retirements. The share of heirs apparent
increases before the CEO turnover period and decreases afterwards. This reects
that most rms only install one heir apparent who either becomes the next chief
executive or typically leaves.
2.6. Results
The multivariate results are presented in three parts. First, I present a stan-
dard probit regression of CEO turnover on exogenous covariates. Second, I display
a "naïve" probit regression of CEO turnover that adds chair independence and
succession planning but erroneously treats these endogenous variables as exoge-
nous. Third, I show my main result: a trinomial probit regression system of CEO
turnover that models chair independence and succession planning endogenously.
These approaches produce signicantly di¤erent results and show that treating
endogenous variables as exogenous can lead to large errors.
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2.6.1. Standard Probit Regression
Table 2.7 shows the marginal e¤ects for a standard probit regression of CEO
turnover on exogenous variables. Industry-adjusted operating and stock returns
are signicantly negative. This is consistent with the relative performance eval-
uation hypothesis where rm performance measured relative to industry bench-
marks reveals CEO ability and untalented chief executives are replaced. The post-
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) dummy is also signicant, indicating that after 2002 CEO
turnover increased.
2.6.2. Naïve Probit Regression
Next, I analyze a naïve regression that ignores the endogeneity in chair indepen-
dence and succession planning. Firms most likely determine chair independence
and succession planning simultaneously but ignoring simultaneity usually leads to
inconsistent estimates. In order to explore the severity of this issue it is instructive
to compare these results with the more robust methods further on.
Table 2.8 displays the marginal e¤ects for a probit regression of CEO turnover
on several exogenous variables, as well as on the endogenous variables succession
planning and chair independence. Succession planning (heir apparent) seems to
have a highly signicant e¤ect that increases the probability of CEO turnover
by 19:3% for natural retirements, 13:2% for forced turnover, and 8:7% overall.
Chair independence also appears to have a highly signicantly e¤ect that increases
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the likelihood of CEO turnover by 6:7% for natural retirements, 7:0% for forced
turnover, and 2:6% overall.
The naïve regression results rely on the assumption that succession planning
and chair independence are exogenous, which is not plausible. If these variables
are functions of other variables then these estimates could be inconsistent. It is
therefore better to use a model that is exible enough to deal with endogenously
determined variables.
2.6.3. Trivariate Probit Regression System
I use a system of recursive, fully observed, and seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR) in order to estimate a model with endogenous variables. The SUR model
includes three stages: the rst stage is a standard probit regression for chair inde-
pendence (Eq. 2.1); the second stage is a bivariate probit for succession planning
(heir apparent) on chair independence (Eq. 2.2); and the third stage is a trivariate
probit for CEO turnover on chair independence and succession planning (Eq. 2.3).
For better identication I impose one exclusion restriction on the second stage and
two on the third stage.
Table 2.9 shows the rst stage, reporting the marginal e¤ects of a probit regres-
sion for chair independence on exogenous covariates. Firm size has a signicantly
negative correlation with chair independence since larger rms are less likely to
have an independent director chairing the board. Operating return has a sig-
nicantly negative correlation with chair independence because underperforming
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rms are more likely to have an independent chair. The insignicant coe¢ cient
for the natural retirement sample may reect upward earnings management by
retiring CEOs. Candidate age between 44 and 52 (after controlling for candidate
existence) has a signicantly positive correlation with chair independence. Ex-
ecutive board members within that age group are more likely to serve under an
independent chairperson. Chair independence also increases signicantly during
the post-SOX years.
The candidate age dummy (after controlling for candidate existence) and the
post-SOX dummy serve as instruments in the SUR model. Table 2.9 shows that
both are signicantly correlated with chair independence and therefore relevant
instruments for the rst stage.
Table 2.10 presents the second stage, displaying the marginal e¤ects of a bi-
variate probit regression for succession planning (heir apparent) on chair indepen-
dence and exogenous variables. Firm size is positively correlated with succession
planning; the larger a rm, the larger its internal talent pool and the higher the
likelihood of an internal heir apparent. Tobins Q is positively correlated with suc-
cession planning; the higher the marginal value of the rm, the higher the return
to talent and the higher the likelihood of an internal heir apparent.
Chair independence is weakly negatively correlated with succession planning
since independent chairs are less likely to appoint an heir apparent from inside the
rm. Chair independence is structurally incompatible with relay successions where
the departing dual CEO-chair remains on the board as a (dependent) chairperson.
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The test result is consistent with hypothesis IE that chair independence makes
succession planning less likely.
The candidate age dummy (after controlling for candidate existence) is an
instrument in the SUR model. Table 2.10 shows that it is signicantly correlated
with succession planning and therefore a relevant instrument for the second stage.
The SUR model uses fully observed dependent variables in all stages and esti-
mates the correlation between the respective error terms. This property makes it
robust to omitted variable problems in all stages except the nal. The regression
estimates are consistent even if inuential variables are omitted in the rst stage.
The correlation between the error terms for the rst (chair independence) and
second (heir apparent) stage is reported as atanh(12) and signicantly negative.
This shows that there is an endogenous relationship between succession planning
and chair independence.
Table 2.11 presents the third and nal stage. It presents the marginal e¤ects
for a trivariate, recursive probit regression of CEO turnover on succession planning
(heir apparent), chair independence and exogenous variables.
Succession planning (heir apparent) is signicantly correlated with CEO turnover,
increasing the likelihood of CEO turnover by 32:3% for natural retirements, 22:0%
for forced turnover, and 20:4% overall. Firms that have an heir apparent are much
more likely to re a chief executive. Without an heir apparent in place, rms show
a greatly reduced willingness to dismiss the CEO, possibly due to the higher cost
and risk of using an untested successor from inside or outside the company. These
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results are consistent with hypothesis DE2 that succession planning makes CEO
turnover more likely.
Chair independence is signicantly correlated with CEO turnover, decreasing
the likelihood of CEO turnover by 4:0% overall (the coe¢ cient estimates are similar
for both natural retirements and forced turnover but less signicant). Independent
chairs are less likely to re a CEO. These test results are not consistent with
hypothesis DE1 because chair independence makes CEO turnover less likely.
The explanation seems to be as follows: A relay succession always comes with
both an heir apparent and a dependent chair. Chair independence therefore rules
out relay successions, and CEO turnover is negatively a¤ected by fewer (relay)
heirs apparent. Any positive e¤ect for chair independence on CEO turnover seems
to be exceeded by the negative e¤ect from the succession planning (heir apparent)
channel.
Industry-adjusted operating and stock returns are signicantly negative. This
is again consistent with the relative performance evaluation hypothesis.
The correlation between the error terms for the rst (chair independence) and
second (heir apparent) stage is again atanh(12), for the rst (chair independence)
and third (CEO turnover) stage is atanh(13), and for the second (heir apparent)
and third (CEO turnover) stage is atanh(23). The correlation is in all cases
highly signicant and shows that there is an endogenous relationship between
chair independence, succession planning, and CEO turnover.
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When comparing these results with the naïve regressions above it seems that
endogeneity indeed greatly inuences the estimates for chair independence and the
existence of an heir apparent. The correlation between succession planning (heir
apparent) and CEO turnover is approximately twice that suggested by the single-
equation model. The correlation between chair independence and CEO turnover
changes sign and becomes signicantly negative. Clearly there is a substantial bias
in the naïve single-equation regressions and renders them useless when endogeneity
is present.
Succession planning seems to have an even larger e¤ect on CEO turnover than
suggested by previous research. Chair independence does not seem to su¢ ciently
improve corporate governance. Instead, chair independence rules out the common
relay succession model and appears to cause frictions that exceed its potential
benets.
2.7. Conclusion
There is extensive literature on the individual determinants of CEO turnover.
However, only a few articles have examined more complex systems of corporate
decision making and address endogeneity issues in observational data.
This paper analyzes how chair independence and succession planning inu-
ence CEO turnover. I use a recursive SUR system in order to provide consistent
estimates of decision variables that are determined simultaneously with omitted
variables. A new comprehensive data set permits the selection of a large sample.
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The analysis shows that succession planning has an even larger e¤ect on CEO
turnover than suggested by previous research. Chair independence has a signif-
icantly negative e¤ect on succession planning due to frictions with the common
relay succession model. Overall, chair independence makes CEO turnover less
likely.
Subsamples of natural CEO retirements and forced turnover show that these
results are not driven by unobserved hetherogeneity in CEO ability.
These results di¤er markedly from a naïve regression that ignores endogeneity
in chair independence and succession planning, as well as demonstrating that great
care must be exercised when analyzing the e¤ect of endogenous corporate decision
variables.
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2.8. Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.1: Chair Independence by Period
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Figure 2.2: Heir Apparent by Period
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CHAPTER 3
How Do Corporate Boards Learn About CEO Ability?
Evidence from Structural Estimation
3.1. Abstract
CEO ability is an important determinant of rm performance but is usually
not directly observable. I use simulated method of moments (SMM) in order to
estimate a dynamic model of learning about CEO ability from the rms stock
market valuations, operating returns, and CEO turnover. This model features an
information asymmetry between the rms board of directors and the stock market,
as well as misalignment between the board and shareholders.
I nd that learning about CEO ability is inuenced by the stock markets public
signal, the boards private signal, and operating returns in a ratio of 2:3 : 2:1 : 1.
When learning about CEO ability corporate boards rely mostly on public stock
market information and inside information available only to the board, but are less
concerned with accounting data.
3.2. Introduction
CEO ability is an important determinant of rm performance but is usually
not directly observable. A corporate board must rely on a variety of signals to
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learn about managerial ability over time in order to either reward or replace the
CEO. The prior literature establishes that operating and stock returns have an
e¤ect on forced CEO turnover. But it is unclear to which extent boards use this
information to update their beliefs about CEO ability.
This paper empirically examines how boards learn about CEO ability quarter
by quarter from operating returns, stock market valuations, and insider information
in order to make costly CEO turnover decisions. I use a dynamic model with a
rational board of directors that maximizes expected utility. Each CEO has an
unobservable and constant level of ability that a¤ects rm prots. The rms board
uses Bayesrule in order to learn about CEO ability from news regarding operating
return, stock market valuation and a private signal. The market learns about
CEO ability from operating return, stock market valuation, and the boards ring
decision and sets the rms valuation accordingly. Each period the market and
board update their beliefs, and CEO ability gradually becomes a known quantity.
The board optimally decides to keep the chief executive, or to incur the cost of
appointing a new CEO of unknown ability based on expected ability and tenure
of the incumbent CEO.
In this model four factors inuence turnover decisions: the di¤erence in ex-
pected CEO ability, the rate of board learning, the turnover cost to shareholders,
and the boards personal disutility from CEO turnover.
Measuring these factors empirically for infrequent CEO turnover events poses
a challenge. The boards CEO turnover decisions are endogenous and inuence
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rm prots. Both market expectations of CEO ability and the boards optimal
turnover policy are endogenously reected in stock market valuations. Some vari-
ables cannot be observed: the CEO talent pool, actual and expected CEO ability,
the markets and boards signals of ability, and the boards personal disutility
of dismissing a chief executive. No obvious instruments are available. Although
reduced-form empirical analysis can been used to determine directional e¤ects, the
magnitudes of these e¤ects can only be estimated using an economic model.
I therefore use a structural approach that uses endogenous patterns in rm
behavior in order to estimate unobservable model parameters. The advantage of
structural methods is that they can determine both directional e¤ects and their
magnitude but do not require instruments. Furthermore, structural economic mod-
els are normative and can be used to investigate counter-factuals.
I estimate the models parameters using the simulated method of moments
(SMM) applied to a new quarterly sample of rm protability, stock prices, and
CEO turnover for listed U.S. rms between 1999 and 2008. The estimated model
parameters include the prior mean ability and variance of the new CEO talent
pool, the variance and persistence in rm-specic protability, the variance in the
markets public and the boards private signals of CEO ability, the rms cost of
chief executive turnover, and the boards disutility cost of CEO turnover.
Over time corporate boards learn about CEO ability from observing operating
returns, stock market valuations, and private signals available only to the board. I
can determine these signalsinuence on the boards learning of CEO ability and
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turnover policy. I nd that learning about CEO ability is inuenced by the stock
markets public signal, the boards private signal, and operating returns in a ratio
of 2:3 : 2:1 : 1. In order to learn about CEO ability corporate boards rely primarily
on public stock market information and inside information available only to the
board, but are less concerned with accounting data.
The model also provides information regarding the CEO talent pool which
is dened by the prior mean and dispersion of CEO ability. The prior mean is
estimated at 0:68% in the industry-adjusted annual operating return on assets
(OROA) per quarter. CEO ability is slightly right-skewed; some high CEO ability
outliers are expected. The estimated prior dispersion for CEO ability is 0:44%
per quarter. This appears small, but comparing new CEOs at the 5th and 95th
percentiles of ability shows a substantial OROA di¤erence of 21:960:53%p4 =
3:45% per year; CEO ability does indeed seem to matter.
Furthermore, I nd a signicant cost of CEO turnover. The boards e¤ective
total turnover cost is 2:99% of rm assets (or US$230 million for the average rm).
The real nancial cost to the rm is 1:92% of total assets (or US$148million for the
average rm). Corporate boards are reluctant to dismiss CEOs and retain some
low ability CEOs that shareholders would rather have red. The wedge between
shareholder interest and board behavior is consistent with CEO entrenchment.
The downside of structural methods is that they require strong assumptions for
parameter identication: rst, in the model CEO ability fully accounts for long-
term variation in rm protability. Second, the rms turnover cost is realized
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during the quarter of the event. Third, the board considers only shareholder value
and personal disutility of turnover for the rms optimal ring policy.
This paper relates to both the corporate nance and asset pricing literatures.
Within asset pricing several articles focus on the way learning about rm fun-
damentals a¤ects stock returns and volatility. Pástor and Pietro (2003) present
a stock valuation model that features learning about average protability. Pastor
and Veronesi (2009) survey related papers and show that learning can explain many
asset pricing phenomena such as stock return predictability, stock price bubbles,
and investor portfolio choices. Within corporate nance, Holmström (1999) shows
how learning about management ability inuences managerial incentives and cor-
porate governance. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) use CEO turnover events to show
that individual managers have an e¤ect on rm performance.
Several papers model learning for managerial turnover. Hermalin andWeisbach
(1998) present a static CEO turnover model with endogenous monitoring and CEO
compensation. Pan et al. (2013) introduce a dynamic model of CEO turnover and
show that learning about CEO ability a¤ects stock return volatility. Eisfeldt and
Kuhnen (2013) develop a competitive assignment model of chief executive turnover,
pay and rm performance. In a closely related paper Taylor (2010) analyzes CEO
turnover using a dynamic discrete choice model estimated with simulated methods
of moments (SMM). I extend his model and include stock market valuations, allow
asymmetric information between the board and the market, as well as learning by
the market, and use a comprehensive set of new quarterly data.
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.3 describes the model, Section
3.4 introduces the estimation method, Section 3.5 presents the main results, and
Section 3.6 closes with conclusions.
3.3. Model
The model formalizes learning about CEO ability and is an extension of Taylor
(2010). During each period the market and board draw inferences using the arrival
of news regarding rm performance and other signals concerning CEO ability.
In the model each CEO has an unobservable and constant level of ability that
a¤ects rm prots. The rms board and the stock market know all other model
parameters. The rms board uses Bayesrule in order to learn CEO ability from
news regarding the operating return, stock market valuation, and a private signal.
The market learns from operating return, a public signal, and the boards ring
decision about CEO ability and sets the rms valuation accordingly. Each period
the market and board both update their beliefs and CEO ability gradually becomes
a known quantity. Based on expected CEO ability and tenure, the board optimally
decides to keep the chief executive, or to incur the cost of appointing a new CEO
of unknown ability.
Figure 3.1 shows the models time-line of events. At t0 a new CEO of unknown
ability  arrives. At t1 the CEO produces signals that are informative about
CEO ability: the rms operating return y, the markets signal zm and the boards
signal zb. In turn the board observes these three signals, updates its expectations
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about CEO ability b, and decides to either retain or to re the CEO. Finally, the
market observes the operating return y, the markets signal zm, and the boards
ring decision d, updates its expectation about CEO ability m, and sets the new
rm valuation Q. Each period the board learns more about the CEOs ability
until the chief executive either leaves voluntarily or is replaced by a successor of
unknown ability and the cycle recommences. If the board only observes a favorable
signal during a single period then it cannot be sure if its due to high CEO ability
or luck. However, favorable signals over multiple periods generally correspond to
high CEO ability. This model allows mis-pricing in rm valuations and measures
the degree of misinformation.
The term abilityin the model is general and can be interpreted in di¤erent
ways (Pan et al. (2013)): rst, it could mean that the CEOs underlying talent
determines rm performance in the broadest sense. Second, abilityin the model
could relate to the quality of the job match between the CEO and the rm. In
this case CEO ability would be specic to the rm and would not be transferrable
to another rm. Third, abilitycould also refer to the corporate strategy imple-
mented by the CEO. In that case CEO ability would be specic to a particular
strategy and rm, and not be transferrable toward implementing another strategy
at either the same rm or another rm.
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3.3.1. Assumptions
The rm is innitely-lived and there is an innite pool of CEO succession candi-
dates. Each period the board makes optimal CEO turnover decisions by either
keeping the incumbent or asking a successor to take over the helm. The CEO can
resign voluntarily but must retire upon reaching a xed tenure limit.
Forced CEO turnover creates real costs for the rm (executive search fees, sever-
ance packages, and disruption costs), but board members also incur personal costs
(disutility from ring the CEO due to personal or professional ties to the CEO,
for exerting uncompensated e¤ort, or "rocking the boat" makes reappointment to
the board less likely). The board cares about shareholder value to a degree, but
personal disutility from ring the CEO can create misalignment with shareholders
as well as cause CEO entrenchment.
The board is risk-neutral and maximizes its lifetime utility according to:
(3.1) Ut = max
fdt+sg1s=0
Mt   Et
1X
s=0
sBt+sdt+sc
(pers)
with CEO turnover policy dt 2 f0; 1g, board alignment  > 0, discount factor
 2 (0; 1), book value of assets Bt, boards personal turnover cost c(pers), and
expected present value of rm cash ows:
(3.2) Mt = Et
1X
s=0
sBt+sYt+s
where:
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Yt = t + yt   dtc(firm)(3.3)
yt = yt 1 + (t 1   yt 1) + t
t =
8><>: i s N (0; 
2
0) if t = 0 or dt = 1
t 1 otherwise
with industry protability t, rm-specic protability before CEO turnover cost
yt, unobservable CEO ability t, persistence  2 [0; 1], protability shock t s
N(0; 2), rm turnover cost c
(firm), and rm protability Yt.
3.3.2. Model Solution
For a model solution, the boards learning and optimization problems must be
solved. The board updates its belief of CEO ability according to Bayess Rule.
The boards beliefs and objective function are used to derive the Bellman equation,
which is solved numerically. The market also learns about CEO ability, using a
value function and the boards optimal turnover policy in order to value the rm.
3.3.2.1. The Boards Learning Problem. The board observes rm-specic
protability yt, a public signal observed by the stock market and the board zm;t s
N (i; 2m), and a private signal observed only by the board zb;t s N (i; 2b) in order
to learn CEO ability i over time. With each observation (yt; zm;t; zb;t) at CEO
tenure  t the boards belief of CEO ability b;t  Eti and MSE 2b;t  V ar(b;t)
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are updated according to (see appendix for proof):
b;t = b;t 1 + 
2
b;t

2
2
1
2m
1
2b
266664
y;t
m;t
b;t
377775(3.4)
2b;t =
20
1 +  t20(
2
2
+ 1
2m
+ 1
2b
)
(3.5)
266664
y;t
m;t
b;t
377775 =
266664
1

(yt   yt 1)  yt 1   b;t 1
zm;t   b;t 1
zb;t   b;t 1
377775(3.6)
3.3.2.2. The Boards Optimization Problem. The board updates its belief
about CEO ability according to Equation (3.4). The CEO is red when expected
ability falls below an endogenous threshold, depending on CEO tenure and the
models parameters. The board maximizes Equation (3.1) with the optimal r-
ing policy fdt+sg1s=0. The model can be solved numerically for the corresponding
Bellman equation; for details see appendix.
3.3.2.3. The Markets Learning Problem. The market cannot observe the
boards private signal zb;t, or the boards belief b;t. However, the boards decision
not to re the CEO is an informative signal. The market therefore uses rm-specic
protability yt, a public signal zm;t s N (i; 2m), and the boards ring decision dt,
in order to learn CEO ability i over time. If the board res the incumbent CEO
then a successor CEO comes in and market learning begins again with m;t = 0.
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With each observation (yt; zm;t; dt) at CEO tenure  t the markets belief of CEO
ability m;t  Eti and MSE 2m;t  V ar(m;t) are updated according to (see
appendix for proof):
m;t = m;t 1 + 
2
m;t

2
2
1
2m
1
2d
266664
y;t
m;t
d;t
377775(3.7)
2m;t =
2m;t 1
1 + 2m;t 1(
2
2
+ 1
2m
+ 1
2d;t
)
(3.8)
266664
y;t
m;t
d;t
377775 =
266664
1

(yt   yt 1)  yt 1   m;t 1
zm;t   m;t 1
d;t   m;t 1
377775(3.9)
where:
d;t  Em;t[b;t(zb;t) j dt = 0](3.10)
= Em;t[zb;t j zb;t  t   2b(
2y;t
2
+
m;t
2m
)  zt ]
= m;t + b(m;t)
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and:
(m;t)  (m;t)
1  (m;t)(3.11)
m;t 
zt   m;t
b
The variance of the boards expected ability for surviving CEOs is:
2d;t  V arm;t[b;t(zb;t) j dt 1 = 0](3.12)
= V arm;t[zb;t j zb;t  zt ]
= 2b [1  !(m;t)]
where:
(3.13) !(m;t)  (m;t)[(m;t)  m;t]
3.3.2.4. The Markets Valuation Problem. There is an information asym-
metry between the rms board and the stock market, but otherwise there are no
frictions, investors are risk-neutral and have rational expectations. In a rational
expectations equilibrium the market is assumed to know the optimal CEO turnover
policy fdt+sg1s=0, instantly reecting the updated expectation of CEO ability m;t
in the new expected present value of rm cash ows. The boards value function
can be modied to express rm value as average Q; for details, see appendix.
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3.3.3. Model Predictions
The model predicts the boards optimal CEO ring policy along with the tim-
ing and frequency of CEO turnover, as well as the relationship between CEO
dismissals, rm-specic protability, and stock market valuations. Since this dy-
namic discrete choice model has no known analytical solution it must be solved
numerically and therefore I present graphs of empirical simulations rather than
formal propositions.
3.3.3.1. Calibration. The nine model parameters are assumed to be constant
over time and across rms: the prior mean CEO ability 0, the prior dispersion
of CEO ability 0, the persistence of rm-specic protability , the dispersion
of rm-specic protability shocks , the dispersion of the markets public signal
m, the dispersion of the boards private signal b, the rms nancial cost of CEO
turnover c(firm), the boards disutility cost of turnover c(pers)=, and the quarterly
discount factor .
Since CEO ability is expressed as the industry-adjusted operating return and
the model assumes a normal distribution, I set the expected prior CEO ability
to zero, i.e. 0 = 0%. Consistent with the accounting literature, the quarterly
persistence of rm-specic protability is  = 0:25. Following Taylor (2010) the
prior standard deviation of CEO ability is 0 = 2:4%, the quarterly standard
deviation of rm-specic protability shocks is  = 1:7%, the quarterly standard
deviation of the boards private signal is b = 2:6%, the rms cost is c(firm) = 1:3%,
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and the boards cost is c(pers)= = 4:6%. I match the precision of the new market
signal to the board signal, i.e. m = 2:6%. The quarterly discount factor is set to
 = 0:98 and the maximum CEO tenure is 60 quarters.
3.3.3.2. Predictions. The board updates its belief of CEO ability after observ-
ing rm-specic protability, as well as market and board signals. The board
replaces a CEO when this belief falls below an endogenous threshold. The cut-
o¤ level is a function of CEO tenure and the models parameters. Increasing the
boards e¤ective turnover cost c(board) = c(pers)= decreases the threshold belief
and probability of a CEO turnover event. The higher the cost to replace a CEO,
the lower the acceptable level of expected CEO ability. When CEOs have similar
ability, the signals about CEO ability are noisy, or CEO turnover costs are high,
then a board has little incentive to replace one CEO with another.
Figure 3.2 shows the average CEO turnover hazard rate by tenure quarter
for the simulated sample. Since CEO dismissal is costly, it therefore pays to
learn about CEO ability. The CEO turnover hazard is therefore increasing. After
the rst periods of learning the board is still uncertain about CEO ability and
reluctant to re the CEO. However, if bad performance persists then uncertainty
about CEO ability diminishes and ring becomes optimal for low ability CEOs.
As a chief executive nears mandatory retirement the residual values fall relative to
the present value of unknown successors and turnover increases.
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Figure 3.3 displays the markets (blue) and the boards (red) average posterior
CEO ability  around turnover events. The board observes rm-specic prof-
itability, the markets and the boards signals, and then updates its belief about
CEO ability. When expected ability falls below the endogenous threshold a CEO
turnover event is triggered. The rm then recruits a new chief executive of un-
known ability and the posterior mean is reset to the prior mean. The board enjoys
inside information and therefore learns about CEO ability faster than the market.
The market observes rm-specic protability, the markets signal, and the boards
ring decision to update its belief about CEO ability. The speed of learning is de-
termined by the persistence of rm-specic protability, the size of rm-specic
protability shocks, and the accuracy of the signals.
Figure 3.4 shows the average rm-specic protability y around turnover events.
The board learns about low CEO ability from low protability, resulting in a
turnover event. When the incumbent is dismissed the rm incurs a one-time CEO
turnover cost that reduces rm protability. A new CEO of higher average ability
comes in and gradually restores rm prots. Firm-specic protability accordingly
has a V-shape, and a steep slope indicates a fast rate of board learning about chief
executive ability (keeping everything else unchanged).
Figure 3.5 displays Q in event time. Like protability, rm value Q also displays
a V-shape in event-time. Q falls as CEO replacement causes turnover costs that
reduce protability; Q rebounds as protability is restored by eliminating new, low
ability CEOs.
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3.4. Estimation
3.4.1. Data
The primary data source is BoardEx which identies CEOs at U.S. public rms
during the sampling period from 1999 to 2008. The dataset is merged with Com-
pustat for accounting and stock market information. This sample is then restricted
to non-nancial rms1 with a minimum of US$10 million in total assets where the
name of the CEO is known at scal quarter beginning and end. Interim CEOs,
identied by either the title interim or acting chief executive or CEO tenure of less
than 90 days, are excluded. A turnover event occurs when the chief executive at
the scal quarter-end di¤ers from the CEO at the beginning of a scal quarter.
After selecting the initial sample I identify instances of forced CEO turnover.
I select news articles from Factiva that contain the name of each departing chief
executive during a two-year window around the turnover date to classify the likely
cause of the departure. Forced turnover is identied according to the classication
used by Parrino (1997): rst, all turnover where a CEOs is reported to be red
is classied as forced. Second, all other turnover in which CEOs are under age 60
are reviewed further. If the report does not mention that: (i) the exit is health-
related, (ii) the departing CEO either takes a new job in or outside the rm, leaves
for personal or other reasons unrelated to the rm, or (iii) the chief executive
departs in a natural retirement, then such turnover is also classied as forced.
1SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 are excluded
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Retirement is natural when a CEO retires and announces it at least six months
before leaving the rm.
Forced CEO turnover is then further categorized by the rms governance struc-
ture and I select subsamples for CEO duality, inside CEOs, less than median rm
size, and rst half of the sample. Inside CEOs are executives who have worked at
the rm for at least one year before a turnover event. CEO duality is when the
chief executive is also the chairperson of the rm.
Table 3.1 shows that the nal sample includes 40; 417 rm-quarters and 2; 315
CEO spells ending with a turnover event, of which 1; 130 are forced. The turnover
sample is divided further in order to examine the e¤ect of corporate governance
on CEO turnover: 1; 151 turnover events have a CEO-chair (Duality), 1; 400 have
inside CEOs (Insider), 1; 158 are from small rms (Small), and 1; 031 are from
the rst half of the sample (Early). The present sample is to the authors best
knowledge the most comprehensive for CEO turnover during the sampling period.
3.4.2. Identication
In this section I motivate the assumptions that identify the models parameters.
The model parameters are constant over time and across rms. Eight of the model
parameters2 are estimated:
(3.14)  = f0; 0; ; ; m; b; c(firm); c(pers)=g
2I use a quarterly discount factor of  = 0:98 and a rate of voluntary CEO turnover f() estimated
from the sample.
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i.e. the prior mean CEO ability 0, the prior dispersion of CEO ability 0, the
persistence of rm-specic protability , the dispersion of rm-specic protabil-
ity shocks , the dispersion of the markets public signal m, the dispersion of the
boards private signal b, the rms nancial cost of CEO turnover c(firm), and the
boards disutility cost of turnover c(pers)=.
In the model rm-specic return is:
(3.15) yt = i + (1  )yt 1 + t
where i s N (0; 20) and t s N(0; 2). Therefore 0, , , and 0 can be
identied from rm-specic returns. CEO ability directly a¤ects rm-specic re-
turns; therefore for 0 <   1, prior mean CEO ability 0 is identied by the
average rm-specic protability. The persistence of rm-specic protability  is
identied by the rst-order time-series auto-correlation of rm-specic protabil-
ity. The dispersion of rm-specic protability shocks , is identied by the time
series variance of t:
Firm-specic returns can be rewritten in order to yield persistence-adjusted
returns (Taylor (2010)):
(3.16) Xit =
yt   (1  )yt 1

= i +
t
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with variance:
(3.17) V ar(Xit) = 20 +
2
2
Within each CEO spell i, ability is constant. The dispersion of rm-specic prof-
itability shocks  can therefore also be identied using the variance of persistence-
adjusted returns within CEO spells. For known persistence of protability  and
dispersion of protability shocks  the prior dispersion of CEO ability 0 can be
backed out from the variance of persistence-adjusted returns across CEOs.
The period-by-period change in Q within each CEO spell is directly related to
the markets change in expectations about the CEOs ability. Equation (3.8) shows
that the precision of the markets public signal is directly related to the variance
of the markets expectations about CEO ability. The standard deviation of the
markets public signal is therefore indirectly related to the change in Q. The lower
the dispersion of the markets publicly signal m, the higher the markets speed
of learning for each tenure period  t and the lower the dispersion in the markets
expectation of CEO ability. Therefore, if the persistence of protability , the
dispersion of protability shocks , and the prior dispersion of CEO ability 0
are known, then the dispersion of the markets public signal m can be backed out
from the change in average Q within CEO spells.
The time-series change in Q within each CEO spell is also directly related to
the boards change in expectations about the CEOs ability. Equation (3.5) shows
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that precision of the boards public signal is directly related to the variance of the
boards expectations about CEO ability. The standard deviation of the boards
public signal is therefore indirectly related to the change in Q. The lower the
dispersion of the markets publicly signal m, the higher the markets speed of
learning for each tenure period  t and the lower the dispersion in the markets
expectation of CEO ability. The lower dispersion of the boards publicly signal
b, the higher the boards speed of learning for each tenure period  t, and the
lower the dispersion in the boards expectation of CEO ability. If the persistence
of protability , the dispersion of protability error , the prior dispersion of
CEO ability 0, and the dispersion of the markets publicly signal m are known,
then the dispersion of the boards publicly signal b can be backed out from the
change in Q within CEO spells.
The boards speed of learning about CEO ability also has an e¤ect on the CEO
turnover rate and protability around turnover events. The higher the speed of
learning, the sooner the board replaces low-ability CEOs, the higher the turnover
hazard rate in early tenure periods, and the steeper the slope in rm-specic prof-
itability around CEO turnover events. The change of rm-specic protability
around CEO turnover therefore also identies b.
The rms turnover cost c(firm) is identied using the average decrease in rm-
specic protability during the period of the forced CEO turnover event. Increasing
the boards total cost of turnover c = c(firm)+c(board) decreases the threshold belief
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of CEO ability and the likelihood of a CEO turnover event. The probability of
CEO turnover at di¤erent tenure points therefore identies the total turnover cost.
3.4.3. Simulated Method of Moments
No closed-form solutions are available for most dynamic discrete choice models. For
a numerical solution I use the simulated method of moments (SMM) with a Matlab
toolkit provided by Miranda and Fackler (2004) and Fackler and Tastan (2008).
SMM estimates the parameters of structural economic models by simulating data
and determining the parameters that minimize a criterion function for a set of
moment conditions. SMM therefore consists of two parts: an economic model that
describes the mapping of the parameters, shocks, and exogenous variables into
the endogenous variables, and a set of moment conditions that are estimated in
reduced form. The SMM estimates of parameters b are determined by solving:
(3.18) b = argmin

 cM   1
S
SX
s
bms(y())!0W  cM   1
S
SX
s
bms(y())!
where cM is the vector of sample moments and bms(y()) is the vector of mo-
ments from simulation s of the endogenous variables y generated by the set of
parameters . W is the e¢ cient weighting matrix estimated as the inverse of the
covariance matrix of moments M . Since the model can have multiple equilibria I
use a simulated annealing algorithm in order to avoid being stuck in local minima.
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The models eight parameters are identied using 20 moment conditions and
estimated with the following pooled regressions for forced CEO turnover:
yit = 0 + 1yit 1(3.19)
+( 4= 3) +( 2= 1) +(0) +(1=2) +(3=4) + it
2it = V ar() + uit(3.20)
dit = h
(1 4) + h(5 12) + h(13 20) + h(20+) + vit(3.21)
V ari(Xit) = E(V ar(X)) + wit(3.22)
(Ei(Xit)  E(Ei(Xit)))2 = V ar(E(X)) + eit(3.23)
Qit  Qit 1 = 0 + ( 4= 3) + ( 2= 1) + (0) + (1=2) + (3=4) + #it(3.24)
The rst seven moment conditions are the regression coe¢ cients of Equation
(3.19). yit is the rm-specic protability3, 0 is a constant and identies prior
CEO ability 0, and 1 is the rst-order auto-regression coe¢ cient that identies
the persistence of protability . The coe¢ cients (k) are event quarter-xed
e¤ects, conditioned on CEO turnover during period t + k. The turnover period
indicator (0) identies the rms CEO turnover cost c(firm). The persistence of
protability and the boards speed of learning CEO ability determine the steepness
3yit = Yit Y (ind)it , where Yit is the rms protability calculated from quarterly Compustat data
item OIADPQ divided by average AT. I subtract the median protability using the Fama-French
12 industry classication.
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in the V-shaped protability curve around turnover events that jointly identies
m and b.
The eighth moment in Equation (3.20) is the variance of the residual in Equa-
tion (3.19) that identies the dispersion of protability error .
The next four moment conditions are hazard rates for forced CEO turnover.
dit is an indicator for forced CEO turnover, and h(k) is a tenure-xed e¤ect, condi-
tioned on CEO tenure interval k that identies the boards e¤ective turnover cost
c(board).
Moments 13 and 14 use persistence-adjusted rm-specic prots bXit = (yit  b1yit 1)=(1  b1), where b1 is estimated in Equation (3.19). Equation (3.22) esti-
mates the variance of the persistence-adjusted rm-specic protability averaged
within CEO spells, and identies the standard deviation of protability error .
Equation (3.23) estimates the variance of mean persistence-adjusted rm-specic
protability across CEO spells and identies the standard deviation of CEO ability
0.
The remaining six moments in Equation (3.24) use the rst di¤erence in log Q4
within CEO spells. The coe¢ cients (k) are event time-xed e¤ects conditioned on
CEO turnover in period t+k, and 0 is a constant. The persistence of protability
and the markets speed of learning CEO ability determine the steepness in the V-
shaped Q curve around turnover events and identies m. Using di¤erences in logs
4Qit = log(Q
(firm)
it =Q
(ind)
it ), where Qit is the market-to-book ratio calculated from quarterly
Compustat data using (ATQ + PRCCD * CSHOQ - CEQQ - TXDBQ) / ATQ. The denominator
is the industry median using the Fama-French 12 industry classication.
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is akin stock returns and eliminates the e¤ect of unobserved rm heterogeneity on
the level of Q.
3.5. Empirical Results
3.5.1. Parameter Estimates
The baseline estimates for the models eight parameters are presented in Table 3.2.
The initial CEO talent pool is dened by the prior mean and dispersion of
CEO ability. The prior mean 0 is the expected industry-adjusted annual oper-
ating return on assets (OROA) for a new CEO and measures initial expectations
about CEO ability. The prior dispersion 0 is the standard deviation in industry-
adjusted annual OROA for new CEOs and measures initial uncertainty about CEO
ability. The estimated prior mean CEO ability 0 is 0:68% per quarter with a 95%
condence interval [0:67%, 0:69%]. The procedure used to industry-adjust, e¤ec-
tively sets median rm-specic protability to zero. However, since mean ability
is slightly greater than zero then CEO ability is right-skewed; there are some
high CEO ability outliers. The estimated prior dispersion of CEO ability is 0
is 0:44% per quarter with a 95% condence interval [0:43%, 0:45%]. Comparing
new CEOs at the 5th and 95th percentile of ability shows an OROA di¤erence of
2 1:960
p
4 = 3:45% per year. The estimated di¤erence is slightly less than
in Bertrand and Schoar (2003), and Taylor (2010).
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Accounting returns are generally known to be persistent (Fama and French
(2000)). It comes as no surprise that the estimated quarterly rm-specic prof-
itability persistence  is 0:369 (with 95% condence interval [0:368, 0:370]), show-
ing some mean-reversion.
The shock in accounting returns y is modeled with the error term in rm-
specic protability . The estimated standard deviation for the protability error
 is 1:74% per quarter with a 95% condence interval [1:72%, 1:76%].
The shock in the rms stock market valuation Q is modeled using the markets
public signal of CEO ability zm. The estimated standard deviation for the markets
public signal m is 2:04% per quarter with a 95% condence interval [2:02%, 2:06%].
It is useful to compare the inuence of the markets public signal to the protability
signals. Taylor (2010) shows that the e¤ect of a one standard deviation zm shock
on expected CEO ability is Pm = =(m) times larger than a one standard
deviation protability shock. Accordingly, the markets public signal is 2:3 times
more inuential than the protability signal.
The shock in the boards CEO turnover decision d is modeled using the boards
private signal of CEO ability zb. The estimated standard deviation for the boards
public signal b is 2:22% per quarter with a 95% condence interval [2:19%,
2:26%]. The e¤ect of a one standard deviation zb shock on expected CEO ability is
Pb = =(b) times larger than a one standard deviation protability shock. The
boards private signal is therefore 2:1 times more inuential than the protability
signal.
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The boards learning about CEO ability is inuenced by the stock markets
public signal, the boards private signal, and operating returns in a ratio of 2:3 :
2:1 : 1. When learning about CEO ability corporate boards rely primarily on public
stock market information and inside information available only to the board, but
are less concerned with accounting data.
The rms cost of turnover relates to a decline in protability during the quarter
when the incumbent CEO departs. The rms estimated cost of CEO turnover
c(firm) is 1:92% in terms of rm assets with a 95% condence interval [1:89%,
1:96%]. The rms CEO turnover cost amount is US$148 million (US$11 million)
for the mean (median) sample rm. This amount is lower than in Taylor (2010),
possibly because I only consider one calendar quarter of turnover cost.
The boards e¤ective turnover cost is the nancial equivalent of directors
distaste for ring CEOs. The boards estimated total CEO turnover cost c =
c(firm)+ c(board) is 2:99% of the rms assets. The boards total CEO turnover cost
amount is US$230 million (US$17 million) for the mean (median) sample rm.
This amount is also less than in Taylor (2010). The board has substantial disutility
from ring a CEO and behaves as if it costs the average rm US$230 million to
do so. However, the real nancial cost to the average rm is only US$148 mil-
lion. Corporate boards are reluctant to dismiss CEOs and retain some low ability
CEOs that shareholders would rather have red. This wedge between shareholder
interest and board behavior is consistent with CEO entrenchment.
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3.5.2. Model Fit
The overall t of the model can be measured using a 2 test of the over-identifying
restrictions, which uses 20 moments conditions for eight parameter estimates. The
p-value rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% condence level that all simulated
moments are equal to their sample counterparts. However, this rejection is not
particularly surprising because any model can be rejected with a large enough
sample. The present data set has 1; 130 forced turnover events and is quite large.
It is therefore relevant to investigate the 20 moments separately in order to
assess any specic failures in model t. Table 3.3 shows each empirical and sim-
ulated moment condition separately, testing for the di¤erence. For 3 of the 20
moment conditions equality cannot be rejected at the 1% condence level. The
model matches the moments for the change in Q reasonably well: the di¤erence
in moments for the constant 0, and the event quarter-xed e¤ect 
(3=4) are sta-
tistically insignicant. The event quarter-xed e¤ects ( 4= 3) and ( 2= 1) are
greater, and (0) and (1=2) are smaller than the empirical moments. The model
also matches the overall rm-specic protability y quite well: the di¤erence in
moments for the constant 0, the AR1 coe¢ cient 0, and the event-quarter-xed
e¤ects ( 4= 3), ( 2= 1), (1=2), and (3=4) are either economically or statistically
insignicant. Only the event-quarter-xed e¤ect (0) is signicantly lower than
the empirical moments. The model does not match the hazard rates very well: the
simulated moments h(1=4), h(5=12), h(13=20), and h(20+) are signicantly lower than
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their empirical counterparts. Similarly, the model does not match the volatilities
very well: the rst and second measures of time-series volatility in protability
V ar(), and E(V ar(X)), and the dispersion of average protability across CEOs
V ar(E(X)), are all lower than the empirical moments.
There seems to be a reasonable match between model and empirical data.
The match could possibly be improved by extending the period over which CEO
turnover costs are realized. Then CEO turnover would be costlier and lower CEO
turnover hazard rates would better match the data.
3.6. Conclusion
CEO ability a¤ects rm performance but is di¢ cult to measure. Corporate
boards learn from accounting returns, stock market valuations, and private signals
about CEO ability and make costly CEO turnover decisions. Using a dynamic
model with a rational board of directors that maximizes expected utility, I estimate
the models parameters using the simulated method of moments (SMM) applied to
a new quarterly sample of rm protability, stock prices, and both voluntary and
forced CEO turnover for listed U.S. rms. The estimated model parameters include
the mean and variance in the ability of new CEOs, the variance and persistence
in rm-specic protability, the variance in the markets public and the boards
private signals of CEO ability, the rms cost of chief executive turnover, and the
boards disutility cost of CEO turnover.
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I nd that learning about CEO ability is inuenced by the markets public
signal, the boards private signal, and the protability signal in a ratio of 2:3 : 2:1 :
1. When learning about CEO ability corporate boards rely primarily on public
stock market information and private board information, but are less concerned
with accounting data
The dispersion of CEO ability is economically signicant, indicating that CEO
ability matters for rm protability. There is also a signicant cost of CEO
turnover. The boards e¤ective total turnover cost is 2:99% of rm assets (or
US$230 million for the average rm); however, the real nancial cost to the rm is
1:92% of total assets (or US$148 million for the average rm). Corporate boards
are reluctant to dismiss CEOs and retain some low ability CEOs that sharehold-
ers would rather have red. This wedge between shareholder interest and board
behavior is consistent with CEO entrenchment.
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3.7. Figures and Tables
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Figure 3.1: Timeline
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Figure 3.2: CEO Dismissal Hazard Rate
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Figure 3.3: Expected Ability Around CEO Dismissals
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Figure 3.4: Firm-Specic Protability Around CEO Dismissals
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Figure 3.5: Average Q Around CEO Dismissals
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3.8. Proofs
3.8.1. The Boards Learning Problem
Proof. Equation (3.4)
The problem is a Kalman lter with a constant parameter matrix (see Hamilton
(1994), chapter 13.2).
The recursion begins with:
b1j0 = E(1)  0
P1j0 = E((1   b1)(1   b1)0)  20
and updates inferences regarding state variable and associated MSE according to:
bt+1jt = Et(t+1)  t
= Fbtjt 1 +Ktt
bPt+1jt = Et((t+1   bt+1)(t+1   bt+1)0)  2t
= (F KtH0)Ptjt 1(F0  HK0t) +KtRK0t +Q
with gain matrix and innovation:
Kt = FPtjt 1H(H
0Ptjt 1H+R)
 1
t = yt  A0xt  H0btjt 1
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The state equation is then:
t+1|{z}
t+1
= 1|{z}
F
t|{z}
t
+ vt|{z}
vt
and the observation equations are:266664
yt

zm;t
zb;t
377775
| {z }
yt
=
266664
1

  1
0
0
377775
| {z }
A0
yt 1|{z}
xt
+
266664
1
1
1
377775
| {z }
H0
t|{z}
t
+
266664
y;t

zm;t
zb;t
377775
| {z }
wt
The terms vt and wt are white noise and satisfy:
Et(vtv ) =
8><>: Q = 0 for t = 0 otherwise
Et(wtw0 ) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
R =
266664
2=
2 0 0
0 2m 0
0 0 2b
377775 for t = 
0 otherwise
Et(vtw0 ) = 00 for all t and 
Et(vt1) = 0 for all t
Et(wt1) = 0 for all t
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Applying standard results yields:
t = t 1 +Ktt
= t 1 + 
2
t (
2
2
(
1

(yt   yt 1)  yt 1   t 1) +
1
2m
(zm;t   t 1) +
1
2b
(zb;t   t 1))
2t = (F KtH0)Ptjt 1(F0  HK0t) +KtRK0t +Q
= (1 Kt
266664
1
1
1
377775)2t 1(1 

1 1 1

K0t) +Kt
266664
2=
2 0 0
0 2m 0
0 0 2b
377775K0t
=
2t 1
1 + 2t 1(
2
2
+ 1
2m
+ 1
2b
)
=
20
1 + t20(
2
2
+ 1
2m
+ 1
2b
)
Kt = FPtjt 1H(H0Ptjt 1H+R)
 1
= 2t 1

1 1 1

(
266664
1
1
1
3777752t 1

1 1 1

+
266664
2=
2 0 0
0 2m 0
0 0 2b
377775)
 1
=
2t 1
1 + 2t 1(
2
2
+ 1
2m
+ 1
2b
)

2
2
1
2m
1
2b

= 2t

2
2
1
2m
1
2b

t = yt  A0xt  H0btjt 1
=
266664
1

(yt   yt 1)  yt 1   t 1
zm;t   t 1
zb;t   t 1
377775
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Therefore:
b;t = b;t 1 + 
2
b;t

2
2
1
2m
1
2b
266664
y;t
m;t
b;t
377775(3.25)
2b;t =
20
1 +  t20(
2
2
+ 1
2m
+ 1
2b
)266664
y;t
m;t
b;t
377775 =
266664
1

(yt   yt 1)  yt 1   b;t 1
zm;t   b;t 1
zb;t   b;t 1
377775
Note that:
V ar(y;t) = 
2
=
2 + 2()
V ar(m;t) = 
2
m + 
2()
V ar(b;t) = 
2
b + 
2()
Subtract 0 from both sides and forward one period, and then:
t+1 = t + 
2( t+1)

2
2
1
2m
1
2b
266664
y;t+1
m;t+1
b;t+1
377775
where:266664
y;t+1
m;t+1
b;t+1
377775 s N(
266664
0
0
0
377775 ;
266664
2=
2 + 2( t+1) 0 0
0 2m + 
2( t+1) 0
0 0 2b + 
2( t+1)
377775)
By standardizing:
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266664
y;t+1
m;t+1
b;t+1
377775 =
266664
y;t+1(
2
=
2 + 2( t+1))
  1
2
m;t+1(
2
m + 
2( t+1))
  1
2
b;t+1(
2
b + 
2( t+1))
  1
2
377775
we can rewrite:
t+1 = t + 
2( t+1)

2
2
q
2
2
+ 2( t+1)
1
2m
p
2m + 
2( t+1)
1
2b
p
2b + 
2( t+1)
266664
y;t+1
m;t+1
b;t+1
377775
where:266664
y;t+1
m;t+1
b;t+1
377775 s N(
266664
0
0
0
377775 ;
266664
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
377775)
Therefore:
b;t+1 = b;t +(3.26)
2b;t+1

2
2
q
2
2
+ 2b;t+1
1
2m
q
2m + 
2
b;t+1
1
2b
q
2b + 
2
b;t+1
266664
y;t+1
m;t+1
b;t+1
377775
(3.27)
266664
y;t+1
m;t+1
b;t+1
377775 s N(0; I)
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
3.8.2. The Boards Optimization Problem
Proof. The boards optimization problem can be solved by dividing (3.1) by Bt
and , using (3.2) with c(fire) = c(firm) + c
(pers)

, and yielding the value function
(proof below):
max
fdt+sg1s=0
Ut
Bt
= max
fdt+sg1s=0
Et
1X
s=0
s(t+s + yt+s   bt+sc(retire)   dt+sc(fire))(3.28)
= Et
1X
s=0
st+s + V Ft
V Ft = max
fdt+sg1s=0
Et
1X
s=0
s(yt+s   bt+sc(retire)   dt+sc(fire))
= yt 1
1  
1  (1  ) +
0
1  

1  (1  ) + EtV

t
V t = max
dt

b;t

1  (1  )   btc
(retire)   dtc(fire) + EtV t+1

with board belief of excess ability b;t  b;t   0.
The Bellman equation is:
V (b;t;  t; bt) = max
dt
fb;t

1  (1  )   btc
(retire)   dtc(fire) +(3.29)
EtV (b;t+1;  t+1; bt+1)g
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If the current CEO retires (bt = 1), then the rm pays the retirement cost and
hires a new chief executive:
(3.30) V (retire) = V (b;t;  t; 1) = V (0; 0; 0)  c(retire)
If the CEO does not retire (bt = 0) but gets red (dt = 1), then the rm pays
the ring cost and appoints a new CEO:
(3.31) V (fire) = V (b;t;  t; 0) = V (0; 0; 0)  c(fire)
If the rm keeps the CEO (bt = 0 and dt = 0), then:
V (keep) = V (b;t;  t; 0)(3.32)
= b;t

1  (1  ) + [f( t)V
(retire) + (1  f( t))V (b;t+1;  t+1; 0)]
The board maximizes:
(3.33) V (b;t;  t; 0) = max
dt

V (keep); V (fire)
	
and the policy function is:
(3.34) dt = argmax
dt

V (keep); V (fire)
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
Proof. Solution to Value Function (following Taylor (2010)):
V Ft  maxfdt+sg1s=0
Et
1X
s=0
s(yt+s   bt+sc(retire)   dt+sc(fire))
= yt 1
1  
1  (1  ) +
0
1  

1  (1  )
+

1  (1  ) maxfdt+sg1s=0
1X
s=0
sEt(t+s   bt+sc(retire)   dt+sc(fire))
yt = yt 1 + (t 1   yt 1) + t
1

(yt   yt 1) + yt 1 = t 1 + t
1

(yt   yt 1) + yt 1   t = t 1 + t   t  y;t
t 1 + t = t + y;t
yt = yt 1(1  ) + t 1 + t
yt = yt 1(1  ) + t + y;t
yt+1 = yt(1  ) + t+1 + y;t+1 =
(yt 1(1  ) + t + y;t)(1  ) + t+1 + y;t+1 =
yt 1(1  )2 + t(1  ) + t+1 + y;t(1  ) + y;t+1
yt+s = yt 1(1  )s+1 + 
Ps
=0 t+ (1  )s  + 
Ps
=0 y;t+ (1  )s 
Et[yt+s] = Et[yt 1(1 )s+1+
Ps
=0 t+ (1 )s +
Ps
=0 y;t+ (1 )s  ] =
yt 1(1  )s+1 + 
Ps
=0 Et[t+ ](1  )s  + 
Ps
=0 Et[y;t+ ](1  )s  =
yt 1(1  )s+1 + 
Ps
=0 Et[t+ ](1  )s 
Et[
P1
s=0 
syt+s] =
P1
s=0 
sEt[yt+s] =
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P1
s=0 
s(yt 1(1  )s+1 + 
Ps
=0 Et[t+ ](1  )s  ) =
yt 1(1  )
P1
s=0 
s(1  )s + P1s=0Ps=0 sEt[t+ ](1  )s  =
yt 1
1 
1 (1 ) + 
P1
s=0
Ps
=0 
sEt[t+ ](1  )s  =
yt 1
1 
1 (1 ) + 
P1
=0
P1
s= 
sEt[t+ ](1  )s  =
yt 1
1 
1 (1 ) + 
P1
=0 Et[t+ ](1  ) 
P1
s= 
s(1  )s =
yt 1
1 
1 (1 ) + 
P1
=0 Et[t+ ](1  )  ((1 ))

1 (1 ) =
yt 1
1 
1 (1 ) +

1 (1 )
P1
=0 
Et[t+ ] =
yt 1
1 
1 (1 ) +

1 (1 )
P1
s=0 
s(0 + Et[t+s]) =
yt 1
1 
1 (1 ) +
0
1 

1 (1 ) +

1 (1 )
P1
s=0 
sEt[t+s] 
3.8.3. The Markets Learning Problem
Proof. Equation (3.7)
The market cannot observe the boards private signal about CEO ability. How-
ever, by observing that a CEO is repeatedly not red the market updates its ex-
pectation of CEO ability d;t, which can also be treated as a signal. The problem
is a Kalman lter with a time-varying parameter matrix Rt (see Hamilton (1994),
chapter 13.8).
The recursion begins with:
b1j0 = E(1)  0
P1j0 = E((1   b1)(1   b1)0)  20
144
and updates inferences regarding state variable and associated MSE according to:
bt+1jt = Et(t+1)  t
= Fbtjt 1 +Ktt
bPt+1jt = Et((t+1   bt+1)(t+1   bt+1)0)  2t
= (F KtH0)Ptjt 1(F0  HK0t) +KtRtK0t +Q
with gain matrix and innovation:
Kt = FPtjt 1H(H
0Ptjt 1H+Rt)
 1
t = yt  A0xt  H0btjt 1
The state equation is then:
t+1|{z}
t+1
= 1|{z}
F
t|{z}
t
+ vt|{z}
vt
and the observation equations are:266664
yt

zm;t
d;t
377775
| {z }
yt
=
266664
1

  1
0
0
377775
| {z }
A0
yt 1|{z}
xt
+
266664
1
1
1
377775
| {z }
H0
t|{z}
t
+
266664
y;t

zm;t
d;t
377775
| {z }
wt
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The terms vt and wt are white noise and satisfy:
Et(vtv ) =
8><>: Q = 0 for t = 0 otherwise
Et(wtw0 ) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
Rt =
266664
2=
2 0 0
0 2m 0
0 0 2d;t
377775 for t = 
0 otherwise
Et(vtw0 ) = 00 for all t and 
Et(vt1) = 0 for all t
Et(wt1) = 0 for all t
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Applying standard results yields:
t = t 1 +Ktt
= t 1 + 
2
t (
2
2
(
1

(yt   yt 1)  yt 1   t 1) +
1
2m
(zm;t   t 1) +
1
2d;t
(d;t   t 1))
2t = (F KtH0)Ptjt 1(F0  HK0t) +KtRtK0t +Q
= (1 Kt
266664
1
1
1
377775)2t 1(1 

1 1 1

K0t) +Kt
266664
2=
2 0 0
0 2m 0
0 0 2d;t
377775K0t
=
2t 1
1 + 2t 1(
2
2
+ 1
2m
+ 1
2d;t
)
Kt = FPtjt 1H(H0Ptjt 1H+R)
 1
= 2t 1

1 1 1

(
266664
1
1
1
3777752t 1

1 1 1

+
266664
2=
2 0 0
0 2m 0
0 0 2d;t
377775)
 1
=
2t 1
1 + 2t 1(
2
2
+ 1
2m
+ 1
2d;t
)

2
2
1
2m
1
2d;t

= 2t

2
2
1
2m
1
2d;t

t = yt  A0xt  H0btjt 1
=
266664
1

(yt   yt 1)  yt 1   t 1
zm;t   t 1
d;t   t 1
377775
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The market cannot observe the boards private signal zb;t but can learn from the
boards ring decisions dt 1. Dene d;t as the markets expectation of the boards
expected ability provided the CEO was not red, i.e. dt = 0. The board keeps
the CEO if and only if the expected ability remains above the known threshold
t . Solve for the unobserved board signal zb;t, take the expectation of a truncated
normal distribution, and use market expectations to nd:
d;t  Em;t[b;t(zb;t) j dt = 0]
= Em;t[b;t(zb;t)  t ]
= Em;t[b;t 1 + 2b;t

2
2
1
2m
1
2b
266664
y;t
m;t
b;t(zb;t)
377775  t ]
= Em;t[zb;t j zb;t  t   2b(
2y;t
2
+
m;t
2m
)  zt ]
= Em;t[Eb;t[zb;t j zb;t  zt ]]
= Em;t[zb;t + zb;t(b;t)]
= m;t + b(m;t)
where:
(m;t)  (m;t)
1  (m;t)
m;t 
zt   m;t
b
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The variance of the boards expected ability for surviving CEOs is:
2d;t  V arm;t[b;t(zb;t) j dt = 0]
= V arm;t[zb;t j zb;t  zt ]
= 2b [1  !(m;t)]
where:
!(m;t)  (m;t)[(m;t)  m;t]

3.8.4. The Markets Valuation Problem
Proof. By normalizing (3.2) rm value can be written recursively as the average
Q:
Qt  Mt
Bt
= Et
1X
s=0
s(t+s + yt+s   bt+sc(retire)   dt+sc(firm))(3.35)
= Et
1X
s=0
st+s +QFt
QFt = Et
1X
s=0
s(yt+s   bt+sc(retire)   dt+sc(firm))
= yt 1
1  
1  (1  ) +
0
1  

1  (1  ) + EtQ

t
Qt = m;t

1  (1  )   btc
(retire)   dt c(firm) + EtQt+1
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where market belief of excess ability m;t  m;t   0 and:
Q(m;t;  t; bt) = m;t

1  (1  )   btc
(retire)   dt c(firm) +(3.36)
EtQ(m;t+1;  t+1; bt+1)
If the current CEO retires (bt = 1), then the rm pays the CEO retirement
cost and selects a new chief executive from the talent pool:
(3.37) Q(retire) = Q(m;t;  t; 1) = Q(0; 0; 0)  c(retire)
If the CEO does not retire (bt = 0) but is red (dt = 1), then the rm pays the
cost to re the CEO and recruits a new one from the talent pool:
(3.38) Q(fire) = Q(m;t;  t; 0) = Q(0; 0; 0)  c(firm)
If the rm keeps the CEO (bt = 0 and dt = 0), then:
Q(keep) = Q(m;t;  t; 0)(3.39)
= m;t

1  (1  ) + [f( t)Q
(retire) + (1  f( t))Q(m;t+1;  t+1; 0)]

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